1977 - Detail

September 21, 1977 - Fifteen nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, sign a nuclear-proliferation pact, slowing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.



Concern over the spread of nuclear weapons had been a high topic since the use by the United States at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, and various efforts had been ongoing to slow their spread since other nations began acquiring the technology. Within three months after Hiroshima, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada proposed an Atomic Energy Commission at the United Nations to eliminate use of nuclear energy for destructive purposes with the United States offering the Baruch Plan one year later that would place all resources under international control. The efforts failed. By 1964, the United States had been joined by Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China as nuclear powers. By 1966, nuclear power was also being used by five nations for peaceful power purposes, complicating the issue. The spread of nuclear materials increased and the threat of spreading materials for negative purposes an even greater concern.

Efforts to curb this spread had continued even after their initial failure. In 1957, western powers USA, Great Britain, Canada, and France made commitments not to spread nuclear weapons, except for self-defense. In 1963, The Treaty of 1963 curbed nuclear testing. On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft for a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets submitted their own soon after. Eventually, after negotiations between all parties, drafts of a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were submitted on August 24, 1977; it was signed by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union on July 1, 1968 and would go into affect on March 5, 1970. France abstained, but would comply.

By 1977, fifteen nations were considered nuclear suppliers with the ability to spread that technology to other nations if not prohibited by additional measures. The founding nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), including the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, and Japan, began meeting in 1975 to ban further spread of nuclear exports. On September 11, 1977, the principls of the "Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers" were agreed upon, and by mid-1978, the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act" (NNPA) had been approved in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Signed 1968, In Force 1970

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III - 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV - 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V - Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI - Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII - Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII - 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX - 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X - 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI - This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

Full Text, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) 1977-1978

A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978, Public Law 95-242 92 Stat. 120, March 10, 1978

An Act - To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title - That this Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978."

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy - The Congress finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and to continue international progress toward world peace and development. Recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat and the imperative need to increase the effectiveness of international safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activities to prevent proliferation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States to -

(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for fuel supply assurances and the establishment of more effective international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common international sanctions;

(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies by establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for subsequent arrangements and export licenses;

(c) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so at the earliest possible date; and

(d) cooperate with foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable technologies for energy production and, in particular, to identify alternative options to nuclear power in aiding such nations to meet their energy needs, consistent with the economic and material resources of those nations and environmental protection.

Sec. 3. Statement of Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act to promote the policies set forth above by - (a) establishing a more effective framework for international cooperation to meet the energy needs of all nations and to ensure that the worldwide development of peaceful nuclear activities and the export by any nation of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology intended for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contribute to proliferation;

(b) authorizing the United States to take such actions as are required to ensure that it will act reliably in meeting its commitment to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies;

(c) providing incentives to the other nations of the world to join in such international cooperative efforts and to ratify the Treaty; and

(d) ensuring effective controls by the United States over its exports of nuclear materials and equipment and of nuclear technology.

Sec. 4. Definitions -

(a) As used in this Act, the term -

(1) "Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
(2) "IAEA" means International Atomic Energy Agency;
(3) "nuclear materials and equipment" means source material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, and components, items or substances determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109b. of the 1954 Act;
(4) "physical security measures" means measures to reasonably ensure that source or special nuclear material will only be used for authorized purposes and to prevent theft and sabotage;
(5) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant to Chapter 12 of the 1954 Act;
(6) "1954 Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; and
(7) "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(b) All other terms used in this Act not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Treaty.

Title I - United States Initiatives to Provide Adequate Nuclear Fuel Supply

Sec. 101. Policy - The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such actions and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure other nations and groups of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits of atomic energy for peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation Such nuclear fuel shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant to section 161 of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States shall ensure that it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis to enter into new fuel supply commitments consistent with its nonproliferation policies and domestic energy needs. The Commission shall, on a timely basis, authorize the export of nuclear materials and equipment when all the applicable statutory requirements are met.

Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity - The Secretary of Energy is directed to initiate construction planning and design, construction, and operation activities for expansion of uranium enrichment capacity, as elsewhere provided by law. Further the Secretary as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Secretary of State2 are directed to establish and implement procedures which will ensure to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with this Act, orderly processing of subsequent arrangements and export licenses with minimum time delay.

Sec. 103. Report - The President shall promptly undertake a study to determine the need for additional United States enrichment capacity to meet domestic and foreign needs and to promote United States non-proliferation objectives abroad. The President shall report to the Congress on the results of this study within twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 104. International Undertaking - (a) Consistent with section 105 of this Act, the President shall institute prompt discussions with other nations and groups of nations, including both supplier and recipient nations, to develop international approaches for meeting future worldwide nuclear fuel needs. In particular, the President is authorized and urged to seek to negotiate as soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production facilities or material, and such other nations and groups of nations, such as the IAEA, as may be deemed appropriate, with a view toward the timely establishment of binding international undertakings providing for -

(1) the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority (INFA) with responsibility for providing agreed fuel services and allocating agreed upon quantities of fuel resources to ensure fuel supply on reasonable terms in accordance with agreements between INFA and supplier and recipient nations;

(2) a set of conditions consistent with subsection (d) under which international fuel assurances under INFA auspices will be provided to recipient nations. including conditions which will ensure that the transferred materials will not be used for nuclear explosive devices;

(3) devising, consistent with the policy goals set forth in section 403 of this Act, feasible and environmentally sound approaches for the siting, development, and management under effective international auspices and inspection of facilities for the provision of nuclear fuel services, including the storage of special nuclear material;

(4) the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent nuclear reactor fuel under effective international auspices and inspection;

(5) the establishment of arrangements under which nations placing spent fuel in such repositories would receive appropriate compensation for the energy content of such spent fuel if recovery of such energy content is deemed necessary or desirable; and

(6) sanctions for violations of the provisions of or for abrogation of such binding international undertakings.

(b) The President shall submit to Congress not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act proposals for initial fuel assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile of uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 (low-enriched uranium) to be available for transfer pursuant to a sales arrangement to nations which adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation when and if necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such nations. Such submission shall include proposals for the transfer of lowenriched uranium up to an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 NWe years of power from light water nuclear reactors, and shall also include proposals for seeking contributions from other supplier nations to such an interim stockpile pending the establishment of INFA.

(c) The President shall, in the report required by section 103, also address the desirability of and options for foreign participation, including investment, in new United States uranium enrichment facilities. This report shall also address the arrangements that would be required to implement such participation and the commitments that would be required as a condition of such participation. This report shall be accompanied by any proposed legislation to implement these arrangements.

(d) The fuel assurances contemplated by this section shall be for the benefit of nations that adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation. In negotiating the binding international undertakings called for in this section, the President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear-weapon states only if such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.

(e) The report required by section 601 shall include information on the progress made in any negotiations pursuant to this section. (f)(1) The President may not enter into any binding international undertaking negotiated pursuant to subsection (a) which is not a treaty until such time as such proposed undertaking has been submitted to the Congress and has been approved by concurrent resolution.

(2) The proposals prepared pursuant to subsection (b) shall be submitted to the Congress as part of an annual authorization Act for the Department of Energy.

Sec. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle - The President shall take immediate initiatives to invite all nuclear supplier and recipient nations to reevaluate all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, with emphasis on alternatives to an economy based on the separation of pure plutonium or the presence of high enriched uranium, methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the safeguards for existing nuclear technology. The President shall, in the first report required by section 601, detail the progress of such international reevaluation.

Title II - United States Initiatives to Strengthen the International Safeguards System

Sec. 201. Policy - The United States is committed to continued strong support for the principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency to deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek to act with other nations to -

(a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of the IAEA and, in order to implement this section, contribute funds, technical resources, and other support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing safeguards;

(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry out the provisions of Article XII of the Statute of the IAEA;

(c) improve the IAEA safeguards system (including accountability) to ensure -

(1) the timely detection of a possible diversion of source or special nuclear materials which could be used for nuclear explosive devices;

(2) the timely dissemination of information regarding such diversion; and

(3) the timely implementation of internationally agreed procedures in the event of such diversion;

(d) ensure that the IAEA receives on a timely basis the data needed for it to administer an effective comprehensive international safeguards program and that the IAEA provides timely notice to the world community of any evidence of a violation of any safeguards agreement to which it is a party; and

(e) encourage the IAEA, to the maximum degree consistent with the Statute, to provide nations which supply nuclear materials and equipment with the data needed to assure such nations of adherence to bilateral commitments applicable to such supply.

Sec. 202. Training Program - The Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, shall establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training program to be made available to persons from nations and groups of nations which have developed or acquired, or may be expected to develop or acquire, nuclear materials and equipment for use for peaceful purposes. Any such program shall include training in the most advanced safeguards and physical security techniques and technology consistent with the national security interests of the United States.

Sec. 203. Negotiations - The United States shall seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations to -

(1) adopt general principles and procedures, including common international sanctions, to be followed in the event that a nation violates any material obligation with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the event that any nation violates the principles of the Treaty, including the detonation by a non-nuclear-weapon state of a nuclear explosive device; and

(2) establish international procedures to be followed in the event of diversion, theft, or sabotage of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities, and for recovering nuclear materials that have been lost or stolen, or obtained or used by a nation or by any person or group in contravention of the principles of the Treaty.

Title III - Export Organization and Criteria

Sec. 301. Government-to-Government Transfers - (a) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new subsection d. thereof as follows:

d. The authority to distribute special nuclear material under this section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall extend only to the following small quantities of special nuclear material (in no event more than five hundred grams per year of the uranium isotope 233, the uranium isotope 235, or plutonium contained in special nuclear material to any recipient): (1) which are contained in laboratory samples, medical devices, or monitoring or other instruments; or

(2) the distribution of which is needed to deal with an emergency situation in which time is of the essence.

(b) Section 64 of the 1954 Act is amended by inserting the following immediately after the second sentence thereof: "The authority to distribute source material under this section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall in no case extend to quantities of source material in excess of three metric tons per year per recipient."

(c) Chapter 10 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section 111 as follows:

Sec. 111.a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to license the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 54, 64, and 82 of this Act, respectively, in accordance with the same procedures established by law for the export licensing of such material by any person: Provided, That nothing in this section shall require the licensing of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department of Energy under section 82 of this Act.

b. The Department of Energy shall not distribute any special nuclear material or source material under section 54 or 64 of this Act other than under an export license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission until (1) the Department has obtained the concurrence of the Department of State and has consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Defense under mutually agreed procedures which shall be established within not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this provision and (2) the Department finds based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and the information available to the United States Government, that the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their equivalent and any applicable criteria in sub section 128 are met, and that the proposed distribution would not be inimical to the common defense and security.

Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production - Subsection 57b. of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:

b. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States except (1) as specifically authorized under an agreement for cooperation made pursuant to section 123, including a specific authorization in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of this Act, or (2) upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States: Provided. That any such determination by the Secretary of Energy shall be made only with the concurrence of the Department of State and after consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense. Secretary of Energy shall, within ninety days after the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, establish orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the consideration of requests for authorization under this subsection. Such procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such deadlines), an interagency coordinating authority to monitor the processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of interagency administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending requests, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial requests should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary showing, for the decision required under this subsection. The processing of any request proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall not be delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to implement the requirements of this subsection. Any trade secrets or proprietary information submitted by any person seeking an authorization under this subsection shall be afforded the maximum degree of protection allowable by law: Provided further, That the export of component parts as defined in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) shall be governed by sections 109 and 126 of this Act: Provided further, That notwithstanding subsection 402(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95- 91), the Secretary of Energy and not the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall have sole jurisdiction within the Department of Energy over any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in this section, section 54d., section 64, or section 111b.

Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements - (a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 306, 307, and 308, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 131. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS. - a. (1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c. of this Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and shall consult with the Director, the Commission, and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the written determination of the Secretary of Energy that such arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and such proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen days after publication. Whenever the Director declares that he intends to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent arrangement which is the subject of the Director's declaration shall not be published until after the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection c. for the preparation of such Statement, whichever occurs first.

(2) If in the Director's view a proposed subsequent arrangement might significantly contribute to proliferation, he may prepare an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with regard to such proposed subsequent arrangement regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the application of the peaceful use assurances of the relevant agreement to ensure that assistance to be furnished pursuant to the "subsequent arrangement" will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. For the purposes of this section, the term "subsequent arrangements" means arrangements entered into by any agency or department of the United States Government with respect to cooperation with any nation or group of nations (but not purely private or domestic arrangements) involving -

(A) contracts for the furnishing of nuclear materials and equipment;

(B) approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of any source or special nuclear material, production or utilization facility, or nuclear technology;

(C) authorization for the distribution of nuclear materials and equipment pursuant to this Act which is not subject to the procedures set forth in section 111b., section 126, or section 09b.; (D) arrangements for physical security;

(E) arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements;

(F) arrangements for the application of safeguards with respect to nuclear materials and equipment; or

(G) any other arrangement which the President finds to be important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.

(3) The United States will give timely consideration to all requests for prior approval, when required by this Act, for the reprocessing of material proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or a production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated fuel elements containing such material, and additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, will attempt to expedite such consideration when the terms and conditions for such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation or in some other international agreement executed by the United States and subject to congressional review procedures comparable to those set forth in section 123 of this Act.

(4) All other statutory requirements under other sections of this Act for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to this subsection shall continue to apply and other such requirements for prior approval or conditions for entering such arrangement shall also be satisfied before the arrangements takes effect pursuant to subsection a.

(1). b. With regard to any special nuclear material exported by the United States or produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported by the United States -

(1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent arrangements for the retransfer of any such material to a third country for reprocessing, for the reprocessing of any such material, or for the subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material until he has provided the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate with a report containing his reasons for entering into such arrangement and a period of 15 days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) has elapsed: Provided, however, That if in the view of the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate entry into a subsequent arrangement, such period shall consist of fifteen calendar days;

(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a facility which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 or for subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device; and (3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing, that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place under conditions comparable to those which in his view, and that of the Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).

c. The Secretary of Energy shall, within ninety days after the enactment of this section, establish orderly and expeditious procedures, including provisions for necessary administrative actions and interagency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the consideration of requests for subsequent arrangements under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and appeals to higher coordinators to review the status of all pending requests, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial requests be should identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy or decisions diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly as necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurance or evidentiary showings, for the decisions required under this section. Further, such procedure shall specify that if he intends to prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, the Director shall so declare in his response to the Department of Energy. If the Director declares that he intends to prepare such a Statement he shall do so within sixty days of his receipt of a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement (during which time the Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent arrangement), unless pursuant to the Director's request the President waives the sixty-day requirement and notifies the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such waiver and the justification therefor. The processing of any subsequent arrangement proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this section shall not be delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to implement the requirements of this section.

d. Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit, permanently or unconditionally, the reprocessing of spent fuel owned by a foreign nation which fuel has been supplied by the United States, to preclude the United States from full participation in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation provided for in section 105 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978; to in any way limit the presentation or consideration in that evaluation of any nuclear fuel cycle by the United States or any other participation; nor to prejudice open and objective consideration of the results of the evaluation.

e. Notwithstanding subsection 402(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-91), the Secretary of Energy, and not the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, shall have sole jurisdiction within the Department of Energy every any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in this section.

f.(1) With regard to any subsequent arrangement under subsection a.(2)(E) (for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements), where such arrangement involves a direct or indirect commitment of the United States for the storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, of any foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States, the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement, unless: (A)(i) Such commitment of the United States has been submitted to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and has been referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such commitment shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the commitment, any such commitment to be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions; or (ii) if the President has submitted a detailed generic plan for such disposition or storage in the United States to the Congress for period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act), which plan has been referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and has not been disapproved during such sixty-day period by the adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance that Congress does not favor the plan; and the commitment is subject to the terms of an effective plan. Any such plan shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions;

(B) The Secretary of Energy has complied with subsection a.; and

(C) The Secretary of Energy has complied, or in the arrangement will comply with all other statutory requirements of this Act, under sections 54 and 55 and any other applicable sections, and any other requirements of law.

(2) Subsection (1) shall apply to the storage or other disposition in the United States of limited quantities of foreign spent nuclear fuel if the President determines that (A) a commitment under section 54 or 55 of this Act of the United States for storage or other disposition of such limited quantities in the United States is required by an emergency situation, (B) it is in the national interest to take such immediate action, and (C) he notifies the Committees on International Relations and Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation and justification thereof, as soon as possible.

(3) Any plan submitted by the President under subsection f.(1) shall include a detailed discussion, with detailed information, and any supporting documentation thereof, relating to policy objectives, technical description, geographic information, costs data and justifications, legal and regulatory consideration, environmental impact information and any related international agreements, arrangements or understandings. (4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "foreign spent nuclear fuel" shall include any nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the legal ownership or other control of the fuel or the reactor and regardless of the origin or licensing of the fuel or reactor, but not including fuel irradiated in a research reactor.

(b)(1) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding new subsection e. as follows, e. The authority in this section to commit United States funds for any activities pursuant to any subsequent arrangement under section 131a.(2)(E) shall be subject to the requirements of section 131. (2) Section 55 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a proviso at the end of the section as follows, "Providing, That the authority in this section to commit United States funds for any activities pursuant to any subsequent arrangement under section 131a.(2)(E) shall be subject to the requirements of section 131."

Sec. 304. Export Licensing Procedures - (a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section 126 as follows:

Sec 126.Export Licensing Procedures. - a. No license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the "Commission") for the export of any production or utilization facility or any source material or special nuclear material, including distributions of any material by the Department of Energy under section 54, 64, or 82, for which a license is required or requested, and no exemption from any requirement for such an export license may be granted by the Commission, as the case may be, until -

(1) the Commission has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is the judgment of the executive branch that the proposed export or exemption will not be inimical to the common defense and security, or that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. The Secretary of State shall, within ninety days after the enactment of this section, establish orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,3 and the executive branch judgment on export applications under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such applications, express deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the processing of such applications, predetermined procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and interagency disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of inter-agency administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending applications, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial applications should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary showing, for the decisions required under this section. The processing of any export application proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this section shall not be delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to implement the requirements of this section. The executive branch judgment shall be completed in not more than sixty days from receipt of the application or request unless the Secretary of State in his discretion specifically authorizes additional time for consideration of the application or request because it is in the national interest to allow such additional time. The Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of any such authorization. In submitting any such judgment, the Secretary of State shall specifically address the extent to which the export criteria then in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party has adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. In the event he considers it warranted, the Secretary may also address the following additional factors, among others:

(A) whether issuing the license or granting the exemption will materially advance the non-proliferation policy of the United States by encouraging the recipient nation to adhere to the Treaty, or to participate in the undertakings contemplated by section 403 or 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978;

(B) whether failure to issue the license or grant the exemption would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States; and

(C) whether the recipient nation or group of nations has agreed that conditions substantially identical to the export criteria set forth in section 127 of this Act will be applied by another nuclear supplier nation or group of nations to the proposed United States export, and whether in the Secretary's judgment those conditions will be implemented in a manner acceptable to the United States. The Secretary of State shall provide appropriate data and recommendations, subject to requests for additional data and recommendations, as required by the Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as the case may be ; and

(2) the Commission finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their equivalent, and any other applicable statutory requirements, are met: Provided, That continued cooperation under an agreement for cooperation as authorized in accordance with section 124 of this Act shall not be prevented by failure to meet the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of section 127 for a period of thirty days after enactment of this section, and for a period of twenty-three months thereafter if the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that the nation or group of nations bound by the relevant agreement has agreed to negotiations as called for in section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978; however, nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under agreements for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this section:

Provided further, That, if upon the expiration of such twenty-four month period, the President determines that failure to continue cooperation with any group of nations which has been exempted pursuant to the above proviso from the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of section 127 of this Act, but which has not yet agreed to comply with those provisions would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, he may, after notifying the Congress of his determination, extend by Executive order the duration of the above proviso for a period of twelve months, and may further extend the duration of such proviso by one year, increments annually thereafter if he again makes such determination and so notifies the Congress. In the event that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate reports a joint resolution to take any action with respect to any such extension, such joint resolution will be considered in the House or Senate, as the case may be, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of this Act: And additionally provided, That the Commission is authorized to -

(A) make a single finding under this subsection for more than a single application or request, where the applications or requests involve exports to the same country, in the same general time frame, or similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes and under reasonably similar circumstances, and

(B) make a finding under this subsection that there is no material changed circumstance associated with a new application or request from those existing at the time of the last application or request for an export to the same country, where the prior application or request was approved by the Commission using all applicable procedures of this section, and such finding of no material changed circumstance shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of this paragraph for findings of the Commission. The decision not to make any such finding in lieu of the findings which would otherwise be required to be made under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review: And provided further, That nothing contained in this section is intended to require the Commission independently to conduct or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting country or site specific visitations in the Commission's consideration of the application of IAEA safeguards.

b. (1) Timely consideration shall be given by the Commission to requests for export licenses and exemptions and such requests shall be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory requirements have been met.

(2) If, after receiving the executive branch judgment that the issuance of a proposed export license will not be inimical to the common defense and security, the Commission does not issue the proposed license on a timely basis because it is unable to make the statutory determinations required under this Act, the Commission shall publicly issue its decision to that effect, and shall submit the license application to the President. The Commission's decision shall include application to the President. The Commission's decision shall include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting or separate views. If, after receiving the proposed license application and reviewing the Commission's decision, the President determines that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the proposed export may be authorized by Executive order Provided, That prior to any such export, the President shall submit the Executive order, together with his explanation of why in light of the Commission's decision, the export should nonetheless be made, to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g.) and shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such proposed export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the proposed export. Any such Executive order shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions: And provided further, That the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall provide that the Commission shall immediately initiate review of any application for a license under this section and to the maximum extent feasible shall expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive branch review, while awaiting the final executive branch judgment. In initiating its review, the Commission may identify a set of concerns and requests for information associated with the projected issuance of such license and shall transmit such concerns and requests to the executive branch which shall address such concerns and requests in its written communications with the Commission. Such procedures shall also provide that if the Commission has not completed action on the application within sixty days after the receipt of an executive branch judgment that the proposed export or exemption is not inimical to the common defense and security or that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes, the Commission shall inform the applicant in writing of the reason for delay and provide follow-up reports as appropriate. If the Commission has not completed action by the end of an additional sixty days (a total of one hundred and twenty days from receipt of the executive branch judgment), the President may authorize the proposed export by Executive order, upon a finding that further delay would be excessive and upon making the findings required for such Presidential authorization under this subsection, and subject to the Congressional review procedures set forth herein. However, if the Commission has commenced procedures for public participation regarding the proposed export under regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or - within sixty days after receipt of the executive branch judgment on the proposed export - the Commission has identified and transmitted to the executive branch a set of additional concerns or requests for information, the President may not authorize the proposed export until sixty days after public proceedings are completed or sixty days after a full executive branch response to the Commission's additional concerns or requests has been made consistent with subsection a. (1) of this section: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall affect the right of the Commission to obtain data and recommendations from the Secretary of State at any time as provided in subsection a.(1) of this section. c. In the event that the House of Representatives or the Senate passes a joint resolution which would adopt one or more additional export criteria, or would modify any existing export criteria under this Act, any such joint resolution shall be referred in the other House to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, and shall be considered by the other House under applicable procedures provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of this Act.

(b) Within one hundred and twenty days of the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall, after consultations with the Secretary of State, promulgate regulations establishing procedures (1) for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any nuclear export license or exemption pursuant to its statutory authority; (2) for public participation in nuclear export licensing proceedings when the Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest and will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations required by the 1954 Act, including such public hearings and access to information as the Commission deems appropriate: Provided, That judicial review as to any such finding shall be limited to the determination of whether such finding was arbitrary and capricious; (3) for a public written Commission opinion accompanied by the dissenting or separate views of any Commissioner, in those proceedings where one or more Commissioners have dissenting or separate views on the issuance of an export license; and (4) for public notice of Commission proceedings and decisions, and for recording of minutes and votes of the Commission: Provided further, That until the regulations required by this subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the Commission.

(c) The procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing proceedings before the Commission and, notwithstanding section 189a. of the 1954 Act, shall not require the Commission to grant any person an on-the-record hearing in such a proceeding.

(d) Within sixty days of the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Defense, promulgate (and may from time to time amend) regulations establishing the levels of physical security which in its judgment are no less strict than those established by any international guidelines to which the United States subscribes and which in its judgment will provide adequate protection for facilities and material referred to in paragraph (3) of section 127 of the 1954 Act taking into consideration variations in risks to security as appropriate.

Sec. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as a amended by section 304, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 127. CRITERIA GOVERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR EXPORTS -

The United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology: (1) IAEA safeguards, as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material producer through the use of such materials, facilities or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.

(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof. Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations.

(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.

(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.

(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology.

Sec. 306. Additional Export Criterion and Procedures - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304 and 305, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 128. ADDITIONAL EXPORT CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES -

a. (1) As a condition of continued United States export source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export.

(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.

b. The criterion set forth in subsection a. shall be applied as an export criterion with respect to any application for the export of materials, facilities, or technology specified in subsection a. which is filed after eighteen months from the date of enactment of this section, or for any such application under which the first export would occur at least twentyfour months after the date of enactment of this section, except as provided in the following paragraphs:

(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to approve an export to which this subsection applies because such criterion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or authorization may be issued subject to other applicable requirements of law Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization facility or of any source of special nuclear material (intended for use as fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been licensed or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to any non-nuclear- weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion until the first such license or authorization with respect to such state is submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of the reasons underlying the President's determination, the judgment of the executive branch required under section 126 of this Act and any Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions.

(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology specified in subsection a. shall be permitted for the remainder of that Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or the President notifies the Congress that he has determined that significant progress has been made in achieving adherence to such criterion by such state or that United States foreign policy interests dictate reconsideration and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of paragraph (1), does not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it disagrees with the President's determination.

(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval with respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the criterion set forth in subsection a. shall not be applied as an export criterion with respect to exports of materials, facilities and technology specified in subsection a. to that state: Provided, That the first license or authorization with respect to that state which is issued pursuant to this paragraph after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period specified in paragraph (1), and the first such license or authorization which is issued after each twelve-month period thereafter, shall be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to the procedures specified in paragraph (1): Provided further, That if the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval during any review period provided for this paragraph, the provisions of paragraph (2) shall apply with respect to further exports to such state.

Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, and 306, is further amended by adding at the end thereof: Sec. 129. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear Exports -

No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be export to -

(1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or

(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or

(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or

(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such activities; or

(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to have, at any time after the effective date of this section,

(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied or the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto pursuant to section 402(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978; or

(B) assisted, encouraged, or inducted any non-nuclear-weapon state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or inducement; or

(C) entered into an agreement after the date of enactment of this section for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection with an international fuel cycle evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which the United States subscribes; unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided, That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the President's determination, together with a report containing the reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress and referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act), but any such determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions.

Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 306, and 307, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

Sec. 130. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES - a. Not later than forty-five days of continuous session of Congress after the date of transmittal to the Congress of any submission of the President required by subsection 123d., 126a.(2), 126b.(2), 128b., 129, 131a.(3), or 131f.(1)(A) of this Act, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, shall each submit a report to its respective House on its views and recommendations respecting such Presidential submission together with a resolution, as defined in subsection f., stating in substance that the Congress approves or disapproves such submission, as the case may be: Provided, That if any such committee has not reported such a resolution at the end of such forty-five day period, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration of such submission and if, in the case of a proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c. of this Act, the other relevant committee of that House has reported such a resolution, such committee shall be deemed discharged from further consideration of that resolution. If no such resolution has been reported at the end of such period, the first resolution, as defined in subsection f., which is introduced within five days thereafter within such House shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of such House.

b. When the relevant committee or committees have reported such a resolution (or have been discharged from further consideration of such a resolution pursuant to subsection a.) or when a resolution has been introduced and placed on the appropriate calendar pursuant to subsection a., as the case may be it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable. The motion shall not be subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of. c. Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten hours, which shall be divided equally between individuals favoring and individuals opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to a motion to postpone, or a motion to recommit the resolution, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. No amendment to any concurrent resolution pursuant to the procedures of this section is in order except as provided in subsection d. d. Immediately following (1) the conclusion of the debate on such concurrent resolution, (2) a single quorum call at the conclusion of debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, and (3) the consideration of an amendment introduced by the Majority Leader or his designee to insert the phrase, "does not" in lieu of the word "does" if the resolution under consideration is a current resolution of approval, the vote on final approval of the resolution shall occur. e. Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to such a resolution shall be decided without debate.

f. For the purposes of subsections a. through e. of this section, the term "resolution" means a concurrent resolution of the Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the Congress (does or does not) favor the _____ transmitted to the Congress by the President on, _____, _____, the blank spaces therein to be appropriately filled, and the affirmative or negative phrase within the parenthetical to be appropriately selected.

g. For the purposes of this section - (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die; and (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session.

h. This section is enacted by Congress -

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in case of resolutions described by subsection f. of this section; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

Sec. 309. Component and Other Parts of Facilities - (a) Section 109 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows: Sec. 109. Component And Other Parts Of Facilities - a. With respect to those utilization and production facilities which are so determined by the Commission pursuant to subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) the Commission may issue general licenses for domestic activities required to be licensed under section 101, if the Commission determines in writing that such general licensing will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

b. After consulting with the Secretaries of State, Energy, and Commerce, the Commission is authorized and directed to determine which component parts as defined in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) and which other items or substances are especially relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Except as provided in section 126 b.(2), no such component, substance, or item which is so determined by the Commission shall be exported unless the Commission issues a general or specific license for its export after finding, based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the following criteria or their equivalent are met: (1) IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to such component, substance, or item; (2) no such component, substance, or item will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device; and (3) no such component, substance, or item will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior consent of the United States is obtained for such retransfer; and after determining in writing that the issuance of each such general or specific license or category of licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and security: Provided, That a specific license shall not be required for an export pursuant to this section if the component, item or substance is covered by a facility license issued pursuant to section 126 of this Act.5 c. The Commission shall not issue an export license under the authority of subsection b. if it is advised by the executive branch, in accordance with the procedures established under subsection 126a., that the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.

(b) The Commission, not later than one hundred and twenty days after the date of the enactment of this Act, shall publish regulations to implement the provisions of subsections b. and c. of section 109 of the 1954 Act. Among other things, these regulations shall provide for the prior consultation by the Commission with the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(c) The President, within not more than one hundred and twenty days after the date of enactment of the Act, shall publish procedures regarding the control by the Department of Commerce over all export items, other than those licensed by the Commission, which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Among other things, these procedures shall provide for prior consultations, as required, by the Department of Commerce with the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense.

(d) The amendments to section 109 of the 1954 Act made by this section shall not affect the approval of exports contracted for prior to November 1, 1977, which are made within one year of the date of enactment of such amendments.

Title IV - Negotiation of Further Export Controls

Sec. 401. Cooperation with Other Nations - Section 123 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows: Sec. 123. Cooperation With Other Nations - No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or regional defense organizations pursuant to section 53, 54a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until - "a. the proposed agreement for cooperation has been submitted to the President, which proposed agreement shall include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the cooperation; and shall include the following requirements: (1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason;

(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere;

(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose;

(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. and agreements for cooperation with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;

(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and, except in the case of agreements arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c any production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement, will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of the United States;

(6) guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement;

(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;

(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States; and

(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this subsection. The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation (except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c or 144d.) from any of the requirements of the foregoing sentence if he determines that inclusion of any such requirement would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and after consultation with the Commission shall be submitted to the President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy accompanied by the views and recommendations of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Secretary of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the consistency of the text of proposed agreement for cooperation with all the requirements of this Act with specific attention to whether the proposed agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. Each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared pursuant to this Act shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144d., which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, by the Secretary of Defense;

b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation and has made a determination in writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security;

c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an agreement subject to subsection d.), together with the approval and determination of the President, has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g.): Provided, however, That these committees, after having received such agreement for cooperation, may by resolution in writing waive the conditions of all or any portion of such thirty-day period; and

d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., or if entailing implementation of section 53, 54a., 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that may be capable of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear material for use in connection therewith) has been submitted to the Congress, together with the approval and determination of the President, for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, but such proposed agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the sixty-day period shall not begin until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared by the Secretary of State, and any annexes thereto, when required by subsection 123a., has been submitted to the Congress: Provided further, That an agreement for cooperation exempted by the President pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement contained in that subsection shall not become effective unless the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress does favor such agreement. During the sixty-day period the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their respective bodies recommending whether it should be approved or disapproved. Any such proposed agreement for cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section130i. of this Act. Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation (except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c.) to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those committees, promptly furnish to those committees their views as to whether the safeguards and other controls contained therein provide an adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement for cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set forth in subsection 123a.(2), such failure to act shall constitute a failure to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128b.(3) for purposes of the Commission's consideration of applications and requests under section 126a.(2) and there shall be no congressional review pursuant to section 128 of any subsequent license or authorization with respect to that state until the first such license or authorization which is issued after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in which the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the Congress.

Sec. 402. Additional Requirements - (a) Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation, no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the United States for such enrichment: Provided, That the procedures governing such approvals shall be identical to those set forth for the approval of proposed subsequent arrangements under section 131 of the 1954 Act, and any commitments from the recipient which the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State deem necessary to ensure that such approval will be obtained prior to such enrichment shall be obtained prior to the submission of the executive branch judgment regarding the export in question and shall be set forth in such submission: And provided further, That no source or special nuclear material shall be exported for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of nations which has, after the date of enactment of this Act, entered into a new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States, except pursuant to such agreement.

(b) In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement for cooperation (exempt an agreement for cooperation pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c. of the 1954 Act) unless such agreement for cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes of this subsection, the term "major critical component" means any component part or group of component parts which the President determines to be essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility.

Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities - The President shall take immediate and vigorous steps to seek agreement from all nations and groups of nations to commit themselves to adhere to the following export policies with respect to their peaceful nuclear activities and their participation in international nuclear trade: (a) No nuclear materials and equipment and no sensitive nuclear technology within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the nation or group of nations receiving such transfer commits itself to strict undertakings including, but not limited to, provisions sufficient to ensure that -

(1) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclearweapon state, shall be used for nuclear explosive devices for any purpose or for research on or development of nuclear explosive devices for any purpose, except as permitted by Article V, the Treaty;

(2) IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or under control of any nonnuclear- weapon state;

(3) adequate physical security measures will be established and maintained by any nation or group of nations on all of its nuclearactivities; (4) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any nation or group of nations shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations which does not agree to stringent undertakings meeting the objectives of this section; and

(5) no nation or group of nations will assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device.

(b)(1) No source or special nuclear material within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be enriched (as described in paragraph AA.(2) of section 11 of the 1954 Act) or reprocessed, no irradiated fuel elements containing such material which are to be removed from a reactor will be altered in form or content, and no fabrication or stockpiling involving plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235 shall be performed except in a facility under effective international auspices and inspection, and any such irradiated fuel elements shall be transferred to such a facility as soon as practicable after removal from a reactor consistent with safety requirements. Such facilities shall be limited in number to the greatest extent feasible and shall be carefully sited and managed so as to minimize the proliferation and environmental risks associated with such facilities. In addition, there shall be conditions to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon states other than the host country to sensitive nuclear technology associated with such facilities.

(2) Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the necessary short-term storage of fuel elements containing plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (1) shall be placed under effective international auspices and inspection. (c) Adequate physical security measures will be established and maintained with respect to all nuclear activities within the territory of each nation and group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere, and with respect to any international shipment of significant quantities of source or special nuclear material or irradiated source or special nuclear material, which shall also be conducted under international safeguards.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require international control or supervision of any United States military activities.

Sec. 404. Renegotiation of Agreements for Cooperation - (a) The President shall initiate a program immediately to renegotiate agreements for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, or otherwise to obtain the agreement of parties to such agreements for cooperation to the undertakings that would be required for new agreement under the 1954 Act. To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act with a cooperating party contains provisions equivalent to any or all of the criteria set forth in section 127 of the 1954 Act with respect to materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto or with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any such material or equipment, any renegotiated agreement with that cooperating party shall continue to contain an equivalent provision with respect to such transferred materials and equipment and such special nuclear material. To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act with a cooperating party does not contain provisions with respect to any nuclear materials and equipment which have previously been transferred under an agreement for cooperation with the United States and which are under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party and with respect to any special nuclear material which is used in or produced through the use thereof and which is under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, which are equivalent to any or all of those required for new and amended agreements for cooperation under section 123a. of the 1954 Act, the President shall vigorously seek to obtain the application of such provisions with respect to such nuclear materials and equipment and such special nuclear material. Nothing in this Act or in the 1954 Act shall be deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under any agreement for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this Act. (b) The President shall annually review each of requirements (1) through (9) set forth for inclusion in agreements for cooperation under section 123a. of the 1954 Act and the export policy goals set forth in section 401 to determine whether it is in the interest of United States non-proliferation objectives for any such requirements or export policies which are not already being applied as export criteria to be enacted as additional export criteria.

(c) If Presidential export criteria proposals, submittal to Congress. the President proposes enactment of any such requirements or export policies as additional export criteria or to take any other action with respect to such requirements or export policy goals for the purpose of encouraging adherence by nations and groups of nations to such requirements and policies, he shall submit such a proposal together with an explanation thereof to the Congress.

(d) If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs6 of the House of Representatives, after reviewing the President's annual report or any proposed legislation, determines that it is in the interest of United States non-proliferation objectives to take any action with respect to such requirements or export policy goals, it shall report a joint resolution to implement such determination. Any joint resolution so reported shall be considered in the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, under applicable procedures provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to subsection 130b. through g. of the 1954 Act.

Sec. 405. Authority to Continue Agreements - (a) The amendments to section 123 of the 1954 Act made by this Act shall not affect the authority to continue cooperation pursuant to agreements for cooperation entered into prior to the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority to include dispute settlement provisions, including arbitration, in any agreement made pursuant to an Agreement of Cooperation.

Sec. 406. Review - No court or regulatory body shall have any jurisdiction under any law to compel the performance of or to review the adequacy of the performance of any Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, or any annexes thereto, called for in this Act or in the 1954 Act.

Sec. 407. Protection of the Environment - The president shall endeavor to provide in any agreement entered into pursuant to section 123 of the 1954 Act for cooperation between the parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities.

Title V - United States Assistance to Developing Countries

Sec. 501. Policy: Report - The United States shall endeavor to cooperate with other nations, international institutions, and private organizations in establishing programs to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources, to cooperate with both developing and industrialized nations in protecting the international environment from contamination arising from both nuclear and non-nuclear energy activities, and shall seek to cooperate with and aid developing countries in meeting their energy needs through the development of such resources and the application of non-nuclear technologies consistent with the economic factors, the material resources of those countries, and environmental protection. The United States shall additionally seek to encourage other industrialized nations and groups of nations to make commitments for similar cooperation and aid to developing countries. The President shall report annually to Congress on the level of other nations' and groups of nations' commitments under such program and the relation of any such commitments to United States efforts under this Title. In cooperating with and providing such assistance to developing countries, the United States shall give priority to parties to the Treaty.

Sec. 502. Programs - (a) The United States shall initiate a program, consistent with the aims of section 501, to cooperate with developing countries for the purpose of - (1) meeting the energy needs required for the development of such countries; (2) reducing the dependence of such countries on petroleum fuels, with emphasis given to utilizing solar and other renewable energy resources; and (3) expanding the energy alternatives available to such countries. (b) Such program shall include cooperation in evaluating the energy alternatives of developing countries, facilitating international trade in energy commodities, developing energy resources, and applying suitable energy technologies. The program shall include both general and country-specific energy assessments and cooperative projects in resource exploration and production, training, research and development. (c) As an integral part of such program, the Department of Energy, under the general policy guidance of the Department of State and in cooperation with the Agency for International Development and other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall initiate, as soon as practicable, a program for the exchange of United States scientists, technicians, and energy experts with those of developing countries to implement the purposes of this section. (d) For the purposes of carrying out this section, there is authorized to be appropriated such sums as are contained in annual authorization Acts for the Department of Energy, including such sums which have been authorized for such purposes under previous legislation. (e) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall ensure the coordination of the activities authorized by this Title with other related activities of the United States conducted abroad, including the programs authorized by sections 103(c), 106(a)(2), and 119 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Sec. 503. Report - Not later than twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall report to the Congress on the feasibility of expanding the cooperative activities established pursuant to section 502(c) into an international cooperative effort to include a scientific peace corps designed to encourage large numbers of technically trained volunteers to live and work in developing countries for varying periods of time for the purpose of engaging in projects to aid in meeting the energy needs of such countries through the search for and utilization of indigenous energy resources and the application of suitable technology, including the widespread utilization of renewable and unconventional energy technologies. Such report shall also include a discussion of other mechanisms to conduct a coordinated international effort to develop, demonstrate, and encourage the utilization of such technologies in developing countries.

Title VI - Executive Reporting

Sec. 601. Reports of the President - (a) The President shall review all activities of Government departments and agencies relating to preventing proliferation and shall make a report to Congress in January of 1979 and annually in January of each year thereafter on the Government's efforts to prevent proliferation. This report shall include but not be limited to - (1) a description of the progress made toward - (A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in sections 104 and 105 of this Act; (B) negotiating the international arrangements or other mutual undertakings contemplated in section 403 of this Act; (C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapons states that are not party to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence, to enter into comparable agreements with respect to safeguards and to forswear the development of any nuclear explosive devices, and discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states which have not taken such steps; (D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as contemplated in section 201 of this Act; and (E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as contemplated in section 404(a) of this Act; (2) an assessment of the impact of the progress, described in paragraph (1) on the non-proliferation policy of the United States; an explanation of the precise reasons why progress has not been made on any particular point and recommendations with respect to appropriate measures to encourage progress; and a statement of what legislative modifications, if any, are necessary in his judgment to achieve the non-proliferation policy of the United States; (3) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states with which the United States has an agreement for cooperation in effect or under negotiation, if any, have - (A) detonated a nuclear device; or (B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on all of their peaceful nuclear activities; or (C) refused to give specific assurances that they will not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; or (D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices; (4) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth in this Act have, on balance, been counterproductive from the standpoint of preventing proliferation; (5) a description of the progress made toward establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance the reliability of the Unites States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation policies; (6)8 a description of the implementation of nuclear and nuclearrelated dual-use export controls in the preceding calendar year, including a summary by type of commodity and destination of - (A) all transactions for which - (i) an export license was issued for any good controlled under section 309(c) of this Act; (ii) an export license was issued under section 109b. of the 1954 Act; (iii) approvals were issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979, or section 109b.(3) of the 1954 Act, for the retransfer of any item, technical data, component, or substance; or (iv) authorizations were made as required by section 57b.(2) of the 1954 Act to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material; (B) each instance in which - (i) a sanction has been imposed under section 821(a) or section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act; (ii) sales or leases have been denied under section 3(f) of the Arms Export Control Act or transactions prohibited by reason of acts relating to proliferation of nuclear explosive devices as described in section 40(d) of that Act; (iii) a sanction has not been imposed by reason of section 821(c)(2) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 or the imposition of a sanction has been delayed under section 102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act; or (iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made under - (I) section 821(f) or section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, (II) section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, (III) section 40(g) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to the last sentence of section 40(d) of that Act, or (IV) section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to section 620E of that Act or section 3(f), the last sentence of section 40(d), or 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act; and (C) the progress of those independent states of the former Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states and of the Baltic states towards achieving the objective of applying full scope safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. Portions of the information required by paragraph (6) may be submitted in classified form, as necessary. Any such information that may not be published or disclosed under section 12(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be submitted as confidential. (b) In the first report required by this section, the President shall analyze each civil agreement for cooperation negotiated pursuant to section 123 of the 1954 Act, and shall discuss the scope and adequacy of the requirements and obligations relating to safeguards and other control therein.

Sec. 602. Additional Reports - (a) Reports by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy. The annual reports to the Congress by the Commission and the Department of Energy which are otherwise required by law shall also include views and recommendations regarding the policies and actions of the United States to prevent proliferation which are the statutory responsibility of those agencies. The Department's report shall include a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative nuclear fuel cycles. This part of the report shall include a comprehensive version which includes any relevant classified information and a summary unclassified version.

(b) Additional reporting requirements. The reporting requirements of this title are in addition to and not in lieu of any other reporting requirements under applicable law.

(c) Congressional notification of nonproliferation activities.

(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission, and, with regard to subparagraph (B), the Director of Central Intelligence, shall keep the Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to -

(A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of this Act and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery; and

(B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.

(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to paragraph (1)(B), the phrase "fully and currently informed" means the transmittal of credible information not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the activity concerned.

(d) Classified portions of reports. Any classified portions of the reports required by this Act shall be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

(e) [Omitted]

(f) Access by Secretary of Defense to information regarding nuclear proliferation matters; applicability.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall have access, on a timely basis, to all information regarding nuclear proliferation matters which the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Energy has or is entitled to have. Such access shall include access to all communications, materials, documents, and records relating to nuclear proliferation matters.

(2) This subsection does not apply to any intradepartmental document of the Department of State or the Department of Energy, or any portion of such document, that is solely concerned with internal, confidential advice on policy concerning the conduct of interagency deliberations on nuclear proliferation matters.

Sec. 603. Savings Clause - (a) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, contracts, agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges - (1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective in the exercise of functions which are the subject of this Act, by (i) any agency or officer, or part thereof, in exercising the functions which are affected by this Act, or (ii) any court of competent jurisdiction, and (2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or repealed as the case may be, by the parties thereto or by any court of competent jurisdiction. (b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the procedures or requirements applicable to agreements for cooperation entered into pursuant to section 91c., 144b., or 144c. of the 1954 Act or arrangements pursuant thereto as it was in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of this Act. (c) Except where otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon enactment regardless of any requirement for the promulgation of regulations to implement such provisions.

Other Provisions: Provision of Certain Information to Congress - (a) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION. - The head of each department and agency described in section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c)) shall promptly provide information to the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in meeting the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of section 602 of such Act.

Photo above: Crater formed by the Sedan Nuclear Test, 1962, United States Federal Government. Courtesy Wikipedia Commons. Photo below: Secretary of State Averell Harriman (right) shaking hands during signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, one of first efforts at halting the spread of nuclear material, Marion S. Trikosko, August 8, 1963. Courtesy Library of Commerce. Source Info: Electronic Research Collections, United States Department of State, University of Illinois Richard J. Daley Library; United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission; govtrack.us; the Nuclear Information Project; Wikipedia Commons.