
Photo above: President Richard Nixon. Courtesy National Archives. Right: Statue of Secretariat at Belmont Park, 2014, courtesy Wikipedia Commons.
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Timeline
1977 - Detail
September 21, 1977 - Fifteen nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, sign a nuclear-proliferation pact, slowing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Concern over the spread of nuclear weapons had been a high topic since the use by the United States at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, and various efforts had been ongoing to slow their spread since other nations began acquiring the technology. Within three months after Hiroshima, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada proposed an Atomic Energy Commission at the United Nations to eliminate use of nuclear energy for destructive purposes with the United States offering the Baruch Plan one year later that would place all resources under international control. The efforts failed. By 1964, the United States had been joined by Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China as nuclear powers. By 1966, nuclear power was also being used by five nations for peaceful power purposes, complicating the issue. The spread of nuclear materials increased and the threat of spreading materials for negative purposes an even greater concern.
Efforts to curb this spread had continued even after their initial failure. In 1957, western powers USA, Great Britain, Canada, and France made commitments not to spread nuclear weapons, except for self-defense. In 1963, The Treaty of 1963 curbed nuclear testing. On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft for a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets submitted their own soon after. Eventually, after negotiations between all parties, drafts of a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were submitted on August 24, 1977; it was signed by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union on July 1, 1968 and would go into affect on March 5, 1970. France abstained, but would comply.
By 1977, fifteen nations were considered nuclear suppliers with the ability to spread that technology to other nations if not prohibited by additional measures. The founding nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), including the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, and Japan, began meeting in 1975 to ban further spread of nuclear exports. On September 11, 1977, the principls of the "Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers" were agreed upon, and by mid-1978, the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act" (NNPA) had been approved in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Signed 1968, In Force 1970
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III - 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV - 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V - Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI - Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII - Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII - 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX - 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X - 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI - This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

Full Text, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) 1977-1978
A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978, Public Law 95-242 92 Stat. 120, March 10, 1978
An Act - To provide for more efficient and effective control over the proliferation
of nuclear explosive capability.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
Sec. 1. Short Title - That this Act may be cited as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978."
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy - The Congress finds and declares that the proliferation of nuclear
explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise
acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the
United States and to continue international progress toward world peace
and development. Recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat and
the imperative need to increase the effectiveness of international
safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activities to prevent
proliferation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States to -
(a) actively pursue through international initiatives mechanisms for
fuel supply assurances and the establishment of more effective
international controls over the transfer and use of nuclear materials and
equipment and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to
prevent proliferation, including the establishment of common
international sanctions;
(b) take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the
United States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and
fuel to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies by
establishing procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for
subsequent arrangements and export licenses;
(c) strongly encourage nations which have not ratified the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to do so at the earliest
possible date; and
(d) cooperate with foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable
technologies for energy production and, in particular, to identify
alternative options to nuclear power in aiding such nations to meet their
energy needs, consistent with the economic and material resources of
those nations and environmental protection.
Sec. 3. Statement of Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act to promote the policies set forth above
by - (a) establishing a more effective framework for international
cooperation to meet the energy needs of all nations and to ensure that the
worldwide development of peaceful nuclear activities and the export by
any nation of nuclear materials and equipment and nuclear technology
intended for use in peaceful nuclear activities do not contribute to
proliferation;
(b) authorizing the United States to take such actions as are required
to ensure that it will act reliably in meeting its commitment to supply
nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation
policies;
(c) providing incentives to the other nations of the world to join in
such international cooperative efforts and to ratify the Treaty; and
(d) ensuring effective controls by the United States over its exports of
nuclear materials and equipment and of nuclear technology.
Sec. 4. Definitions -
(a) As used in this Act, the term -
(1) "Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
(2) "IAEA" means International Atomic Energy Agency;
(3) "nuclear materials and equipment" means source material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, and components, items or substances determined to have significance
for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109b. of the 1954 Act;
(4) "physical security measures" means measures to reasonably ensure that source or special nuclear material will only be used for authorized purposes and to prevent theft and sabotage;
(5) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to
the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of
heavy water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant to Chapter 12 of the 1954 Act;
(6) "1954 Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; and
(7) "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(b) All other terms used in this Act not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Treaty.
Title I - United States Initiatives to Provide Adequate Nuclear Fuel Supply
Sec. 101. Policy - The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such actions
and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure
other nations and groups of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable
supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which
adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation Such nuclear fuel
shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant to section 161
of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States
shall ensure that it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis
to enter into new fuel supply commitments consistent with its
nonproliferation policies and domestic energy needs. The Commission
shall, on a timely basis, authorize the export of nuclear materials and
equipment when all the applicable statutory requirements are met.
Sec. 102. Uranium Enrichment Capacity - The Secretary of Energy is directed to initiate construction planning and design, construction, and operation activities for expansion of
uranium enrichment capacity, as elsewhere provided by law. Further the
Secretary as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
Secretary of State2 are directed to establish and implement procedures
which will ensure to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with this
Act, orderly processing of subsequent arrangements and export licenses
with minimum time delay.
Sec. 103. Report - The President shall promptly undertake a study to determine the need
for additional United States enrichment capacity to meet domestic and
foreign needs and to promote United States non-proliferation objectives
abroad. The President shall report to the Congress on the results of this
study within twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act.
Sec. 104. International Undertaking - (a) Consistent with section 105 of this Act, the President shall
institute prompt discussions with other nations and groups of nations,
including both supplier and recipient nations, to develop international
approaches for meeting future worldwide nuclear fuel needs. In
particular, the President is authorized and urged to seek to negotiate as
soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production
facilities or material, and such other nations and groups of nations, such
as the IAEA, as may be deemed appropriate, with a view toward the
timely establishment of binding international undertakings providing for -
(1) the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority
(INFA) with responsibility for providing agreed fuel services and
allocating agreed upon quantities of fuel resources to ensure fuel
supply on reasonable terms in accordance with agreements between
INFA and supplier and recipient nations;
(2) a set of conditions consistent with subsection (d) under which
international fuel assurances under INFA auspices will be provided to
recipient nations. including conditions which will ensure that the
transferred materials will not be used for nuclear explosive devices;
(3) devising, consistent with the policy goals set forth in section
403 of this Act, feasible and environmentally sound approaches for
the siting, development, and management under effective
international auspices and inspection of facilities for the provision of
nuclear fuel services, including the storage of special nuclear
material;
(4) the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent
nuclear reactor fuel under effective international auspices and
inspection;
(5) the establishment of arrangements under which nations
placing spent fuel in such repositories would receive appropriate
compensation for the energy content of such spent fuel if recovery of
such energy content is deemed necessary or desirable; and
(6) sanctions for violations of the provisions of or for abrogation
of such binding international undertakings.
(b) The President shall submit to Congress not later than six months
after the date of enactment of this Act proposals for initial fuel
assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile of uranium
enriched to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 (low-enriched
uranium) to be available for transfer pursuant to a sales arrangement to
nations which adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation
when and if necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such
nations. Such submission shall include proposals for the transfer of lowenriched
uranium up to an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 NWe
years of power from light water nuclear reactors, and shall also include
proposals for seeking contributions from other supplier nations to such an
interim stockpile pending the establishment of INFA.
(c) The President shall, in the report required by section 103, also
address the desirability of and options for foreign participation, including
investment, in new United States uranium enrichment facilities. This
report shall also address the arrangements that would be required to
implement such participation and the commitments that would be
required as a condition of such participation. This report shall be
accompanied by any proposed legislation to implement these
arrangements.
(d) The fuel assurances contemplated by this section shall be for the
benefit of nations that adhere to policies designed to prevent
proliferation. In negotiating the binding international undertakings called
for in this section, the President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that
the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear-weapon
states only if such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful
nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear
explosive device; do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing
facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such
existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.
(e) The report required by section 601 shall include information on
the progress made in any negotiations pursuant to this section.
(f)(1) The President may not enter into any binding international
undertaking negotiated pursuant to subsection (a) which is not a treaty
until such time as such proposed undertaking has been submitted to the
Congress and has been approved by concurrent resolution.
(2) The proposals prepared pursuant to subsection (b) shall be
submitted to the Congress as part of an annual authorization Act for
the Department of Energy.
Sec. 105. Reevaluation of Nuclear Fuel Cycle - The President shall take immediate initiatives to invite all nuclear
supplier and recipient nations to reevaluate all aspects of the nuclear fuel
cycle, with emphasis on alternatives to an economy based on the
separation of pure plutonium or the presence of high enriched uranium,
methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the
safeguards for existing nuclear technology. The President shall, in the
first report required by section 601, detail the progress of such
international reevaluation.
Title II - United States Initiatives to Strengthen the International
Safeguards System
Sec. 201. Policy - The United States is committed to continued strong support for the
principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to
a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency
and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency
to deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek to act
with other nations to -
(a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of the IAEA and, in
order to implement this section, contribute funds, technical resources,
and other support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing
safeguards;
(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry out the provisions
of Article XII of the Statute of the IAEA;
(c) improve the IAEA safeguards system (including accountability) to
ensure -
(1) the timely detection of a possible diversion of source or
special nuclear materials which could be used for nuclear explosive
devices;
(2) the timely dissemination of information regarding such
diversion; and
(3) the timely implementation of internationally agreed
procedures in the event of such diversion;
(d) ensure that the IAEA receives on a timely basis the data needed
for it to administer an effective comprehensive international safeguards
program and that the IAEA provides timely notice to the world
community of any evidence of a violation of any safeguards agreement to
which it is a party; and
(e) encourage the IAEA, to the maximum degree consistent with the
Statute, to provide nations which supply nuclear materials and equipment
with the data needed to assure such nations of adherence to bilateral
commitments applicable to such supply.
Sec. 202. Training Program - The Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission,
shall establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training
program to be made available to persons from nations and groups of
nations which have developed or acquired, or may be expected to
develop or acquire, nuclear materials and equipment for use for peaceful
purposes. Any such program shall include training in the most advanced
safeguards and physical security techniques and technology consistent
with the national security interests of the United States.
Sec. 203. Negotiations - The United States shall seek to negotiate with other nations and
groups of nations to -
(1) adopt general principles and procedures, including common
international sanctions, to be followed in the event that a nation
violates any material obligation with respect to the peaceful use of
nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the
event that any nation violates the principles of the Treaty, including
the detonation by a non-nuclear-weapon state of a nuclear explosive
device; and
(2) establish international procedures to be followed in the event
of diversion, theft, or sabotage of nuclear materials or sabotage of
nuclear facilities, and for recovering nuclear materials that have been
lost or stolen, or obtained or used by a nation or by any person or
group in contravention of the principles of the Treaty.
Title III - Export Organization and Criteria
Sec. 301. Government-to-Government Transfers - (a) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new subsection d. thereof as follows:
d. The authority to distribute special nuclear material under this
section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission shall extend only to the following small
quantities of special nuclear material (in no event more than five hundred
grams per year of the uranium isotope 233, the uranium isotope 235, or
plutonium contained in special nuclear material to any recipient):
(1) which are contained in laboratory samples, medical devices, or
monitoring or other instruments; or
(2) the distribution of which is needed to deal with an emergency
situation in which time is of the essence.
(b) Section 64 of the 1954 Act is amended by inserting the following
immediately after the second sentence thereof: "The authority to
distribute source material under this section other than under an export
license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall in no case
extend to quantities of source material in excess of three metric tons per
year per recipient."
(c) Chapter 10 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section
111 as follows:
Sec. 111.a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to
license the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and
byproduct material by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 54,
64, and 82 of this Act, respectively, in accordance with the same
procedures established by law for the export licensing of such material by
any person: Provided, That nothing in this section shall require the
licensing of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department of
Energy under section 82 of this Act.
b. The Department of Energy shall not distribute any special nuclear
material or source material under section 54 or 64 of this Act other than
under an export license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
until (1) the Department has obtained the concurrence of the Department
of State and has consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of
Defense under mutually agreed procedures which shall be established
within not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this
provision and (2) the Department finds based on a reasonable judgment
of the assurances provided and the information available to the United
States Government, that the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their
equivalent and any applicable criteria in sub section 128 are met, and that
the proposed distribution would not be inimical to the common defense
and security.
Sec. 302. Special Nuclear Material Production - Subsection 57b. of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:
b. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage
in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United
States except (1) as specifically authorized under an agreement for
cooperation made pursuant to section 123, including a specific
authorization in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of this Act,
or (2) upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy after a
determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the
United States: Provided. That any such determination by the Secretary of
Energy shall be made only with the concurrence of the Department of
State and after consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense. Secretary
of Energy shall, within ninety days after the enactment of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, establish orderly and expeditious
procedures, including provision for necessary administrative actions and
inter-agency memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable
to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for the consideration of requests for
authorization under this subsection. Such procedures shall include, at a
minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express
deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted
agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such
deadlines), an interagency coordinating authority to monitor the
processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the
expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and
appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of interagency
administrative coordinators to review the status of all pending requests,
and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent practicable, an
applicant should be advised of all the information required of the
applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the beginning
of the process. Potentially controversial requests should be identified as
quickly as possible so that any required policy decisions or diplomatic
consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An immediate effort
should be undertaken to establish quickly any necessary standards and
criteria, including the nature of any required assurances or evidentiary
showing, for the decision required under this subsection. The processing
of any request proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall not be delayed pending the
development and establishment of procedures to implement the
requirements of this subsection. Any trade secrets or proprietary
information submitted by any person seeking an authorization under this
subsection shall be afforded the maximum degree of protection allowable
by law: Provided further, That the export of component parts as defined
in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) shall be governed by sections 109 and
126 of this Act: Provided further, That notwithstanding subsection
402(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-
91), the Secretary of Energy and not the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission shall have sole jurisdiction within the Department of Energy
over any matter arising from any function of the Secretary of Energy in
this section, section 54d., section 64, or section 111b.
Sec. 303. Subsequent Arrangements - (a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305,
306, 307, and 308, is further amended by adding at the end
thereof the following:
Sec. 131. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS. - a. (1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement
under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for
cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c. of this
Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the
Secretary of State and shall consult with the Director, the Commission,
and the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have
the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any
proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage
or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for
which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by
a recipient of source or special nuclear material, production or utilization
facilities, or nuclear technology. Notice of any proposed subsequent
arrangement shall be published in the Federal Register, together with the
written determination of the Secretary of Energy that such arrangement
will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and such
proposed subsequent arrangement shall not take effect before fifteen days
after publication. Whenever the Director declares that he intends to
prepare a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement pursuant to
paragraph (2) of this subsection, notice of the proposed subsequent
arrangement which is the subject of the Director's declaration shall not
be published until after the receipt by the Secretary of Energy of such
Statement or the expiration of the time authorized by subsection c. for the
preparation of such Statement, whichever occurs first.
(2) If in the Director's view a proposed subsequent arrangement
might significantly contribute to proliferation, he may prepare an
unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with regard to
such proposed subsequent arrangement regarding the adequacy of the
safeguards and other control mechanisms and the application of the
peaceful use assurances of the relevant agreement to ensure that
assistance to be furnished pursuant to the "subsequent arrangement" will
not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. For the
purposes of this section, the term "subsequent arrangements"
means arrangements entered into by any agency or department of the
United States Government with respect to cooperation with any
nation or group of nations (but not purely private or domestic
arrangements) involving -
(A) contracts for the furnishing of nuclear materials and
equipment;
(B) approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is
required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of any
source or special nuclear material, production or utilization
facility, or nuclear technology;
(C) authorization for the distribution of nuclear materials and
equipment pursuant to this Act which is not subject to the
procedures set forth in section 111b., section 126, or section 09b.;
(D) arrangements for physical security;
(E) arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated
fuel elements;
(F) arrangements for the application of safeguards with respect
to nuclear materials and equipment; or
(G) any other arrangement which the President finds to be
important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation.
(3) The United States will give timely consideration to all requests
for prior approval, when required by this Act, for the reprocessing of
material proposed to be exported, previously exported and subject to
the applicable agreement for cooperation, or special nuclear material
produced through the use of such material or a production or
utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement for
cooperation, or to the altering of irradiated fuel elements containing
such material, and additionally, to the maximum extent feasible, will
attempt to expedite such consideration when the terms and conditions
for such actions are set forth in such agreement for cooperation or in
some other international agreement executed by the United States and
subject to congressional review procedures comparable to those set
forth in section 123 of this Act.
(4) All other statutory requirements under other sections of this
Act for the approval or conduct of any arrangement subject to this
subsection shall continue to apply and other such requirements for
prior approval or conditions for entering such arrangement shall also
be satisfied before the arrangements takes effect pursuant to
subsection a.
(1). b. With regard to any special nuclear material exported by the United
States or produced through the use of any nuclear materials and
equipment or sensitive nuclear technology exported by the United
States -
(1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent
arrangements for the retransfer of any such material to a third country
for reprocessing, for the reprocessing of any such material, or for the
subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500
grams resulting from the reprocessing of any such material until he has
provided the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate
with a report containing his reasons for entering into such arrangement
and a period of 15 days of continuous session (as defined in subsection
130g. of this Act) has elapsed: Provided, however, That if in the view
of the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen circumstances
requiring immediate entry into a subsequent arrangement, such period
shall consist of fifteen calendar days;
(2) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any subsequent
arrangement for the reprocessing of any such material in a facility
which has not processed power reactor fuel assemblies or been the
subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor prior to the date of
enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 or for
subsequent retransfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any plutonium
in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from such reprocessing,
unless in his judgment, and that of the Secretary of State, such
reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of the
risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval
is requested. Among all the factors in making this judgment, foremost
consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing or
retransfer will take place under conditions that will ensure timely
warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the
time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the
diverted material into a nuclear explosive device; and
(3) the Secretary of Energy shall attempt to ensure, in entering
into any subsequent arrangement for the reprocessing of any such
material in any facility that has processed power reactor fuel
assemblies or been the subject of a subsequent arrangement therefor
prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, or for the subsequent retransfer to any non-nuclear-weapon state
of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from
such reprocessing, that such reprocessing or retransfer shall take place
under conditions comparable to those which in his view, and that of the
Secretary of State, satisfy the standards set forth in paragraph (2).
c. The Secretary of Energy shall, within ninety days after the
enactment of this section, establish orderly and expeditious procedures,
including provisions for necessary administrative actions and interagency
memoranda of understanding, which are mutually agreeable to the
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for the consideration of requests for subsequent
arrangements under this section. Such procedures shall include, at a
minimum, explicit direction on the handling of such requests, express
deadlines for the solicitation and collection of the views of the consulted
agencies (with identified officials responsible for meeting such
deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating authority to monitor the
processing of such requests, predetermined procedures for the
expeditious handling of intra-agency and inter-agency disagreements and
appeals to higher coordinators to review the status of all pending
requests, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the extent
practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information required
of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs at the
beginning of the process. Potentially controversial requests be should
identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy or decisions
diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner. An
immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly as necessary
standards and criteria, including the nature of any required assurance or
evidentiary showings, for the decisions required under this section.
Further, such procedure shall specify that if he intends to prepare a
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, the Director shall so declare
in his response to the Department of Energy. If the Director declares that
he intends to prepare such a Statement he shall do so within sixty days of
his receipt of a copy of the proposed subsequent arrangement (during
which time the Secretary of Energy may not enter into the subsequent
arrangement), unless pursuant to the Director's request the President
waives the sixty-day requirement and notifies the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of such waiver and the
justification therefor. The processing of any subsequent arrangement
proposed and filed as of the date of enactment of this section shall not be
delayed pending the development and establishment of procedures to
implement the requirements of this section.
d. Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit, permanently or
unconditionally, the reprocessing of spent fuel owned by a foreign nation
which fuel has been supplied by the United States, to preclude the United
States from full participation in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation provided for in section 105 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978; to in any way limit the presentation or consideration in that
evaluation of any nuclear fuel cycle by the United States or any other
participation; nor to prejudice open and objective consideration of the
results of the evaluation.
e. Notwithstanding subsection 402(d) of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (Public Law 95-91), the Secretary of Energy, and not
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, shall have sole jurisdiction
within the Department of Energy every any matter arising from any
function of the Secretary of Energy in this section.
f.(1) With regard to any subsequent arrangement under subsection
a.(2)(E) (for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements), where
such arrangement involves a direct or indirect commitment of the United
States for the storage or other disposition, interim or permanent, of any
foreign spent nuclear fuel in the United States, the Secretary of Energy
may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement, unless:
(A)(i) Such commitment of the United States has been submitted
to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as
defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and has been referred to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, but any such commitment shall not become effective if during
such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the commitment, any such
commitment to be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in
section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential
submissions; or (ii) if the President has submitted a detailed generic
plan for such disposition or storage in the United States to the
Congress for period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in
subsection 130g. of this Act), which plan has been referred to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and has not been disapproved during such sixty-day period by
the adoption of a concurrent resolution stating in substance that
Congress does not favor the plan; and the commitment is subject to
the terms of an effective plan. Any such plan shall be considered
pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the
consideration of Presidential submissions;
(B) The Secretary of Energy has complied with subsection a.; and
(C) The Secretary of Energy has complied, or in the arrangement
will comply with all other statutory requirements of this Act, under
sections 54 and 55 and any other applicable sections, and any other
requirements of law.
(2) Subsection (1) shall apply to the storage or other disposition in the
United States of limited quantities of foreign spent nuclear fuel if the
President determines that (A) a commitment under section 54 or 55 of
this Act of the United States for storage or other disposition of such
limited quantities in the United States is required by an emergency
situation, (B) it is in the national interest to take such immediate action,
and (C) he notifies the Committees on International Relations and
Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Energy and Natural Resources of
the Senate of the determination and action, with a detailed explanation
and justification thereof, as soon as possible.
(3) Any plan submitted by the President under subsection f.(1) shall
include a detailed discussion, with detailed information, and any
supporting documentation thereof, relating to policy objectives, technical
description, geographic information, costs data and justifications, legal
and regulatory consideration, environmental impact information and any
related international agreements, arrangements or understandings.
(4) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "foreign spent
nuclear fuel" shall include any nuclear fuel irradiated in any nuclear
power reactor located outside of the United States and operated by any
foreign legal entity, government or nongovernment, regardless of the
legal ownership or other control of the fuel or the reactor and regardless
of the origin or licensing of the fuel or reactor, but not including fuel
irradiated in a research reactor.
(b)(1) Section 54 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding new
subsection e. as follows, e. The authority in this section to commit United States funds for
any activities pursuant to any subsequent arrangement under section
131a.(2)(E) shall be subject to the requirements of section 131.
(2) Section 55 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a proviso
at the end of the section as follows, "Providing, That the authority in
this section to commit United States funds for any activities pursuant
to any subsequent arrangement under section 131a.(2)(E) shall be
subject to the requirements of section 131."
Sec. 304. Export Licensing Procedures - (a) Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act is amended by adding a new section
126 as follows:
Sec 126.Export Licensing Procedures. - a. No license may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(the "Commission") for the export of any production or utilization
facility or any source material or special nuclear material, including distributions
of any material by the Department of Energy under section 54, 64, or 82,
for which a license is required or requested, and no exemption from any
requirement for such an export license may be granted by the
Commission, as the case may be, until -
(1) the Commission has been notified by the Secretary of State that it is
the judgment of the executive branch that the proposed export or
exemption will not be inimical to the common defense and security, or
that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs
would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it
lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes. The Secretary of State
shall, within ninety days after the enactment of this section, establish
orderly and expeditious procedures, including provision for necessary
administrative actions and inter-agency memoranda of understanding,
which are mutually agreeable to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and
Commerce, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,3 and the executive
branch judgment on export applications under this section. Such
procedures shall include, at a minimum, explicit direction on the
handling of such applications, express deadlines for the solicitation and
collection of the views of the consulted agencies (with identified officials
responsible for meeting such deadlines), an inter-agency coordinating
authority to monitor the processing of such applications, predetermined
procedures for the expeditious handling of intra-agency and interagency
disagreements and appeals to higher authorities, frequent meetings of
inter-agency administrative coordinators to review the status of all
pending applications, and similar administrative mechanisms. To the
extent practicable, an applicant should be advised of all the information
required of the applicant for the entire process for every agency's needs
at the beginning of the process. Potentially controversial applications
should be identified as quickly as possible so that any required policy
decisions or diplomatic consultations can be initiated in a timely manner.
An immediate effort should be undertaken to establish quickly any
necessary standards and criteria, including the nature of any required
assurances or evidentiary showing, for the decisions required under this
section. The processing of any export application proposed and filed as
of the date of enactment of this section shall not be delayed pending the
development and establishment of procedures to implement the
requirements of this section. The executive branch judgment shall be
completed in not more than sixty days from receipt of the application or
request unless the Secretary of State in his discretion specifically
authorizes additional time for consideration of the application or request
because it is in the national interest to allow such additional time. The
Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of
any such authorization. In submitting any such judgment, the Secretary
of State shall specifically address the extent to which the export criteria
then in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party has
adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. In
the event he considers it warranted, the Secretary may also address the
following additional factors, among others:
(A) whether issuing the license or granting the exemption will
materially advance the non-proliferation policy of the United States
by encouraging the recipient nation to adhere to the Treaty, or to
participate in the undertakings contemplated by section 403 or 404(a)
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978;
(B) whether failure to issue the license or grant the exemption
would otherwise be seriously prejudicial to the non-proliferation
objectives of the United States; and
(C) whether the recipient nation or group of nations has agreed
that conditions substantially identical to the export criteria set forth in
section 127 of this Act will be applied by another nuclear supplier
nation or group of nations to the proposed United States export, and
whether in the Secretary's judgment those conditions will be
implemented in a manner acceptable to the United States.
The Secretary of State shall provide appropriate data and
recommendations, subject to requests for additional data and
recommendations, as required by the Commission or the Secretary of
Energy, as the case may be ; and
(2) the Commission finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the
assurances provided and other information available to the Federal
Government, including the Commission, that the criteria in section 127
of this Act or their equivalent, and any other applicable statutory
requirements, are met: Provided, That continued cooperation under an
agreement for cooperation as authorized in accordance with section 124
of this Act shall not be prevented by failure to meet the provisions of
paragraph (4) or (5) of section 127 for a period of thirty days after
enactment of this section, and for a period of twenty-three months
thereafter if the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that the nation
or group of nations bound by the relevant agreement has agreed to
negotiations as called for in section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978; however, nothing in this subsection shall be
deemed to relinquish any rights which the United States may have under
agreements for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this
section:
Provided further, That, if upon the expiration of such twenty-four
month period, the President determines that failure to continue
cooperation with any group of nations which has been exempted pursuant
to the above proviso from the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of
section 127 of this Act, but which has not yet agreed to comply with
those provisions would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security, he may, after notifying the Congress of
his determination, extend by Executive order the duration of the above
proviso for a period of twelve months, and may further extend the
duration of such proviso by one year, increments annually thereafter if he
again makes such determination and so notifies the Congress. In the
event that the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
reports a joint resolution to take any action with respect to any such
extension, such joint resolution will be considered in the House or
Senate, as the case may be, under procedures identical to those provided
for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of this Act:
And additionally provided, That the Commission is authorized to -
(A) make a single finding under this subsection for more than
a single application or request, where the applications or requests
involve exports to the same country, in the same general time frame,
or similar significance for nuclear explosive purposes and under
reasonably similar circumstances, and
(B) make a finding under this subsection that there is no
material changed circumstance associated with a new application or
request from those existing at the time of the last application or
request for an export to the same country, where the prior application
or request was approved by the Commission using all applicable
procedures of this section, and such finding of no material changed
circumstance shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of this
paragraph for findings of the Commission. The decision not to make
any such finding in lieu of the findings which would otherwise be
required to be made under this paragraph shall not be subject to
judicial review: And provided further, That nothing contained in this
section is intended to require the Commission independently to
conduct or prohibit the Commission from independently conducting
country or site specific visitations in the Commission's consideration
of the application of IAEA safeguards.
b. (1) Timely consideration shall be given by the Commission
to requests for export licenses and exemptions and such requests shall
be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory
requirements have been met.
(2) If, after receiving the executive branch judgment that the
issuance of a proposed export license will not be inimical to the
common defense and security, the Commission does not issue the
proposed license on a timely basis because it is unable to make the
statutory determinations required under this Act, the Commission
shall publicly issue its decision to that effect, and shall submit the
license application to the President. The Commission's decision shall
include application to the President. The Commission's decision shall
include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting
or separate views. If, after receiving the proposed license application
and reviewing the Commission's decision, the President determines
that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to
the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or
would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the
proposed export may be authorized by Executive order Provided,
That prior to any such export, the President shall submit the Executive order, together with his explanation of why in light of the Commission's decision, the export should nonetheless be made, to the Congress for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g.) and shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, but any such proposed export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the
proposed export. Any such Executive order shall be considered
pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential submissions: And provided further, That the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 shall provide that the Commission shall immediately initiate review of any application for a license under this section and to the maximum extent feasible shall expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive branch review, while awaiting the final executive branch judgment. In initiating its review, the Commission may identify a set of concerns and requests for information associated with the projected issuance of such license and shall transmit such concerns and requests to the executive branch which shall address such concerns and requests in its written communications with the Commission. Such procedures shall also provide that if the Commission has not completed action on the application within sixty days after the receipt of an executive branch judgment that the proposed export or exemption is not inimical to the common defense and security or that any export in the category to which the proposed export belongs would not be inimical to the common defense and security because it lacks significance for nuclear explosive purposes, the Commission shall inform the applicant in writing of the reason for delay and provide follow-up reports as appropriate. If the Commission has not completed action by the end of an additional sixty days (a total of one hundred and twenty
days from receipt of the executive branch judgment), the President may authorize the proposed export by Executive order, upon a finding that further delay would be excessive and upon making the findings required for such Presidential authorization under this subsection, and subject to the Congressional review procedures set forth herein. However, if the Commission has commenced procedures for public participation regarding the proposed export under regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (b) of section 304 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, or - within sixty days after receipt of the executive branch judgment on the proposed export - the Commission has identified and transmitted to the executive branch a set of additional concerns or requests for information, the President may not authorize the proposed export until sixty days after public proceedings are completed or sixty days after a full executive branch response to the Commission's additional concerns or requests has been made consistent with subsection a. (1) of this section: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall affect the right of the Commission to obtain data and recommendations from the Secretary of State at any time as provided in subsection a.(1) of this section. c. In the event that the House of Representatives or the Senate passes
a joint resolution which would adopt one or more additional export criteria, or would modify any existing export criteria under this Act, any
such joint resolution shall be referred in the other House to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, and
shall be considered by the other House under applicable procedures
provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to section 130 of
this Act.
(b) Within one hundred and twenty days of the date of enactment of
this Act, the Commission shall, after consultations with the Secretary of
State, promulgate regulations establishing procedures (1) for the
granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any nuclear export
license or exemption pursuant to its statutory authority; (2) for public
participation in nuclear export licensing proceedings when the
Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest
and will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations
required by the 1954 Act, including such public hearings and access to
information as the Commission deems appropriate: Provided, That
judicial review as to any such finding shall be limited to the
determination of whether such finding was arbitrary and capricious; (3)
for a public written Commission opinion accompanied by the dissenting
or separate views of any Commissioner, in those proceedings where one
or more Commissioners have dissenting or separate views on the
issuance of an export license; and (4) for public notice of Commission
proceedings and decisions, and for recording of minutes and votes of the
Commission: Provided further, That until the regulations required by this
subsection have been promulgated, the Commission shall implement the
provisions of this Act under temporary procedures established by the
Commission.
(c) The procedures to be established pursuant to subsection (b) shall
constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing
proceedings before the Commission and, notwithstanding section 189a.
of the 1954 Act, shall not require the Commission to grant any person an
on-the-record hearing in such a proceeding.
(d) Within sixty days of the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Defense, promulgate (and may
from time to time amend) regulations establishing the levels of physical
security which in its judgment are no less strict than those established by
any international guidelines to which the United States subscribes and
which in its judgment will provide adequate protection for facilities and
material referred to in paragraph (3) of section 127 of the 1954 Act
taking into consideration variations in risks to security as appropriate.
Sec. 305. Criteria Governing United States Nuclear Exports - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as a amended by section 304, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
Sec. 127. CRITERIA GOVERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
EXPORTS -
The United States adopts the following criteria which, in addition to
other requirements of law, will govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses
from the United States of source material, special nuclear material,
production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
(1) IAEA safeguards, as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will
be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be
exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and
subject to the applicable agreement for cooperation, and to any special
nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
(2) No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology
proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the
applicable agreement for cooperation, and no special nuclear material
producer through the use of such materials, facilities or sensitive nuclear
technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research
on or development of any nuclear explosive device.
(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with
respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any
special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the
Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such
measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the
applicable regulations.
(4) No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology
proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced
through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction
of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the
United States is obtained for such retransfer. In addition to other
requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only
if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer
agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section.
(5) No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear
material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed,
and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a
reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of
the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.
(6) No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the
foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or
equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the
recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such
exported sensitive nuclear technology.
Sec. 306. Additional Export Criterion and Procedures - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304 and 305, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
Sec. 128. ADDITIONAL EXPORT CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES -
a. (1) As a condition of continued United States export source
material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and
any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such
export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect
to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried
out under the control of such state at the time of the export.
(2) The President shall seek to achieve adherence to the foregoing
criterion by recipient non-nuclear-weapon states.
b. The criterion set forth in subsection a. shall be applied as an export
criterion with respect to any application for the export of materials,
facilities, or technology specified in subsection a. which is filed after
eighteen months from the date of enactment of this section, or for any
such application under which the first export would occur at least twentyfour
months after the date of enactment of this section, except as
provided in the following paragraphs:
(1) If the Commission or the Department of Energy, as the case
may be, is notified that the President has determined that failure to
approve an export to which this subsection applies because such
criterion has not yet been met would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security, the license or
authorization may be issued subject to other applicable requirements
of law Provided, That no such export of any production or utilization
facility or of any source of special nuclear material (intended for use
as fuel in any production or utilization facility) which has been
licensed or authorized pursuant to this subsection shall be made to
any non-nuclear- weapon state which has failed to meet such criterion
until the first such license or authorization with respect to such state
is submitted to the Congress (together with a detailed assessment of
the reasons underlying the President's determination, the judgment of
the executive branch required under section 126 of this Act and any
Commission opinion and views) for a period of sixty days of
continuous session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act) and
referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, but such export shall not occur if during such sixty-day period
the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that
the Congress does not favor the proposed export. Any such license or
authorization shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth
in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of Presidential
submissions.
(2) If the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval pursuant to
paragraph (1), no further export of materials, facilities, or technology
specified in subsection a. shall be permitted for the remainder of that
Congress, unless such state meets the criterion or the President
notifies the Congress that he has determined that significant progress
has been made in achieving adherence to such criterion by such state
or that United States foreign policy interests dictate reconsideration
and the Congress, pursuant to the procedure of paragraph (1), does
not adopt a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it disagrees
with the President's determination.
(3) If the Congress does not adopt a resolution of disapproval with
respect to a license or authorization submitted pursuant to paragraph
(1), the criterion set forth in subsection a. shall not be applied as an
export criterion with respect to exports of materials, facilities and
technology specified in subsection a. to that state: Provided, That the
first license or authorization with respect to that state which is issued
pursuant to this paragraph after twelve months from the elapse of the
sixty-day period specified in paragraph (1), and the first such license
or authorization which is issued after each twelve-month period
thereafter, shall be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to
the procedures specified in paragraph (1): Provided further, That if
the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval during any review
period provided for this paragraph, the provisions of paragraph (2)
shall apply with respect to further exports to such state.
Sec. 307. Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, and 306, is further amended by adding at the end thereof:
Sec. 129. Conduct Resulting In Termination Of Nuclear Exports -
No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology
shall be export to -
(1) any non-nuclear-weapon state that is found by the President to
have, at any time after the effective date of this section,
(A) detonated a nuclear explosive device; or
(B) terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards; or
(C) materially violated an IAEA safeguards agreement; or
(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear
material and having direct significance for the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take
steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient
progress toward terminating such activities; or
(2) any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to
have, at any time after the effective date of this section,
(A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the
United States, or, with respect to material or equipment not
supplied under an agreement for cooperation, materially violated
the terms under which such material or equipment was supplied or
the terms of any commitments obtained with respect thereto
pursuant to section 402(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978; or
(B) assisted, encouraged, or inducted any non-nuclear-weapon
state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear
material and having direct significance for the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take
steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient
progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or
inducement; or
(C) entered into an agreement after the date of enactment of
this section for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials,
or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon
state except in connection with an international fuel cycle
evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant
to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which
the United States subscribes; unless the President determines that
cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security: Provided,
That prior to the effective date of any such determination, the
President's determination, together with a report containing the
reasons for his determination, shall be submitted to the Congress
and referred to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate for a period of sixty days of continuous
session (as defined in subsection 130g. of this Act), but any such
determination shall not become effective if during such sixty-day
period the Congress adopts a concurrent resolution stating in
substance that it does not favor the determination. Any such
determination shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set
forth in section 130 of this Act for the consideration of
Presidential submissions.
Sec. 308. Congressional Review Procedures - Chapter 11 of the 1954 Act, as amended by sections 304, 305, 306, and 307, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
Sec. 130. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURES - a. Not later than forty-five days of continuous session of Congress
after the date of transmittal to the Congress of any submission of the
President required by subsection 123d., 126a.(2), 126b.(2), 128b., 129,
131a.(3), or 131f.(1)(A) of this Act, the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement
for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, shall each submit a report
to its respective House on its views and recommendations respecting
such Presidential submission together with a resolution, as defined in
subsection f., stating in substance that the Congress approves or
disapproves such submission, as the case may be: Provided, That if any
such committee has not reported such a resolution at the end of such
forty-five day period, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged
from further consideration of such submission and if, in the case of a
proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection
91c., 144b., or 144c. of this Act, the other relevant committee of that
House has reported such a resolution, such committee shall be deemed
discharged from further consideration of that resolution. If no such
resolution has been reported at the end of such period, the first resolution,
as defined in subsection f., which is introduced within five days
thereafter within such House shall be placed on the appropriate calendar
of such House.
b. When the relevant committee or committees have reported such a
resolution (or have been discharged from further consideration of such a
resolution pursuant to subsection a.) or when a resolution has been
introduced and placed on the appropriate calendar pursuant to subsection
a., as the case may be it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a
previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any
Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration
of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable.
The motion shall not be subject to amendment, or to a motion to
postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other
business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion of other
business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed
to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the
consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain
the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.
c. Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals
in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten hours,
which shall be divided equally between individuals favoring and
individuals opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in
order and not debatable. An amendment to a motion to postpone, or a
motion to recommit the resolution, or a motion to proceed to the
consideration of other business is not in order. A motion to reconsider the
vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in
order. No amendment to any concurrent resolution pursuant to the
procedures of this section is in order except as provided in subsection d.
d. Immediately following (1) the conclusion of the debate on such
concurrent resolution, (2) a single quorum call at the conclusion of
debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House,
and (3) the consideration of an amendment introduced by the Majority
Leader or his designee to insert the phrase, "does not" in lieu of the word
"does" if the resolution under consideration is a current resolution of
approval, the vote on final approval of the resolution shall occur.
e. Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application
of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, to the procedure relating to such a resolution shall be decided
without debate.
f. For the purposes of subsections a. through e. of this section, the
term "resolution" means a concurrent resolution of the Congress, the
matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the
Congress (does or does not) favor the _____ transmitted to the Congress
by the President on, _____, _____, the blank spaces therein to be
appropriately filled, and the affirmative or negative phrase within the
parenthetical to be appropriately selected.
g. For the purposes of this section - (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of
Congress sine die; and (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an
adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session.
h. This section is enacted by Congress -
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed
part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with
respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in case of
resolutions described by subsection f. of this section; and they
supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent
therewith; and (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House
to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House)
at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case
of any other rule of that House.
Sec. 309. Component and Other Parts of Facilities - (a) Section 109 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows: Sec. 109. Component And Other Parts Of Facilities - a. With respect to those utilization and production facilities which are so determined by the Commission pursuant to subsection 11v.(2) or
11cc.(2) the Commission may issue general licenses for domestic activities required to be licensed under section 101, if the Commission determines in writing that such general licensing will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.
b. After consulting with the Secretaries of State, Energy, and Commerce, the Commission is authorized and directed to determine which component parts as defined in subsection 11v.(2) or 11cc.(2) and which other items or substances are especially relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Except as provided in section 126 b.(2), no such
component, substance, or item which is so determined by the Commission shall be exported unless the Commission issues a general or specific license for its export after finding, based on a reasonable
judgment of the assurances provided and other information available to the Federal Government, including the Commission, that the following criteria or their equivalent are met: (1) IAEA safeguards as required by
Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to such component, substance, or item; (2) no such component, substance, or item will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or
development of any nuclear explosive device; and (3) no such
component, substance, or item will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of
any other nation or group of nations unless the prior consent of the
United States is obtained for such retransfer; and after determining in
writing that the issuance of each such general or specific license or
category of licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and
security: Provided, That a specific license shall not be required for an
export pursuant to this section if the component, item or substance is
covered by a facility license issued pursuant to section 126 of this Act.5
c. The Commission shall not issue an export license under the
authority of subsection b. if it is advised by the executive branch, in
accordance with the procedures established under subsection 126a., that
the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the
United States.
(b) The Commission, not later than one hundred and twenty days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, shall publish regulations to
implement the provisions of subsections b. and c. of section 109 of the
1954 Act. Among other things, these regulations shall provide for the
prior consultation by the Commission with the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(c) The President, within not more than one hundred and twenty days
after the date of enactment of the Act, shall publish procedures regarding
the control by the Department of Commerce over all export items, other
than those licensed by the Commission, which could be, if used for
purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Among other things, these procedures shall provide for prior consultations, as required, by the
Department of Commerce with the Department of State, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission, the Department of
Energy, and the Department of Defense.
(d) The amendments to section 109 of the 1954 Act made by this
section shall not affect the approval of exports contracted for prior to
November 1, 1977, which are made within one year of the date of
enactment of such amendments.
Title IV - Negotiation of Further Export Controls
Sec. 401. Cooperation with Other Nations - Section 123 of the 1954 Act is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 123. Cooperation With Other Nations - No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or regional defense organizations pursuant to section 53, 54a., 57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or
144 shall be undertaken until - "a. the proposed agreement for cooperation
has been submitted to the President, which proposed agreement shall
include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the
cooperation; and shall include the following requirements:
(1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth
in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to
all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and
with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced
through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as
the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of
the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions
in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended
for any reason;
(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a
condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the
agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with
respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere;
(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation
arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., a guaranty by the cooperating
party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear
technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no
special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred
pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive
device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive
device, or for any other military purpose;
(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation
arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c. and agreements for cooperation
with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall
have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and
equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear
material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party
detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an
agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;
(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any
Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation
and, except in the case of agreements arranged pursuant to subsection
91c., 144b., or 144c any production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or
through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement,
will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the
jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of
the United States;
(6) guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical
security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material
transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any
special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any
material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred
pursuant to such agreement;
(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged
pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the
cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the
agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced
through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization
facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be
reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or
uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or
other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered
in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;
(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged
pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the
cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium
enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred
pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any
source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or
special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization
facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be
stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the
United States; and
(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged
pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144c., a guaranty by the
cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production
facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the
jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any
sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement
for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this
subsection. The President may exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation
(except an agreement arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c
or 144d.) from any of the requirements of the foregoing sentence if he
determines that inclusion of any such requirement would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
Except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant
to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., any proposed agreement for
cooperation shall be negotiated by the Secretary of State, with the
technical assistance and concurrence of the Secretary of Energy; and
after consultation with the Commission shall be submitted to the
President jointly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy
accompanied by the views and recommendations of the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The Secretary of State shall also provide to the President an unclassified
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (A) which shall analyze the
consistency of the text of proposed agreement for cooperation with all the
requirements of this Act with specific attention to whether the proposed
agreement is consistent with each of the criteria set forth in this
subsection, and (B) regarding the adequacy of the safeguards and other
control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the
agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished
thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive
purpose. Each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement prepared
pursuant to this Act shall be accompanied by a classified annex, prepared
in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing
relevant classified information. In the case of those agreements for
cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d.,
any proposed agreement for cooperation shall be submitted to the
President by the Secretary of Energy or, in the case of those agreements
for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., or 144d.,
which are to be implemented by the Department of Defense, by the
Secretary of Defense;
b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of the
proposed agreement for cooperation and has made a determination in
writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote,
and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and
security;
c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an agreement
subject to subsection d.), together with the approval and determination of
the President, has been submitted to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of continuous session
(as defined in subsection 130g.): Provided, however, That these
committees, after having received such agreement for cooperation, may
by resolution in writing waive the conditions of all or any portion of such
thirty-day period; and
d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if arranged pursuant to
subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d., or if entailing implementation of
section 53, 54a., 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that may be capable
of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear
material for use in connection therewith) has been submitted to the
Congress, together with the approval and determination of the President,
for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as defined in subsection
130g. of this Act) and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a proposed agreement for
cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91c., 144b., 144c., or 144d.,
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, but such proposed
agreement for cooperation shall not become effective if during such
sixty-day period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint
resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the
proposed agreement for cooperation: Provided, That the sixty-day period
shall not begin until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
prepared by the Secretary of State, and any annexes thereto, when
required by subsection 123a., has been submitted to the Congress:
Provided further, That an agreement for cooperation exempted by the
President pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement contained in
that subsection shall not become effective unless the Congress adopts,
and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress does
favor such agreement. During the sixty-day period the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed
agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their respective bodies
recommending whether it should be approved or disapproved. Any such
proposed agreement for cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the
procedures set forth in section130i. of this Act.
Following submission of a proposed agreement for cooperation
(except an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection
91c., 144b., or 144c.) to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State,
the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of either of those
committees, promptly furnish to those committees their views as to
whether the safeguards and other controls contained therein provide an
adequate framework to ensure that any exports as contemplated by such
agreement will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the
common defense and security. If, after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, the Congress fails to disapprove a proposed agreement for
cooperation which exempts the recipient nation from the requirement set
forth in subsection 123a.(2), such failure to act shall constitute a failure
to adopt a resolution of disapproval pursuant to subsection 128b.(3) for
purposes of the Commission's consideration of applications and requests
under section 126a.(2) and there shall be no congressional review
pursuant to section 128 of any subsequent license or authorization with
respect to that state until the first such license or authorization which is
issued after twelve months from the elapse of the sixty-day period in
which the agreement for cooperation in question is reviewed by the
Congress.
Sec. 402. Additional Requirements - (a) Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation,
no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United
States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the
United States for such enrichment: Provided, That the procedures
governing such approvals shall be identical to those set forth for the
approval of proposed subsequent arrangements under section 131 of the
1954 Act, and any commitments from the recipient which the Secretary
of Energy and the Secretary of State deem necessary to ensure that such
approval will be obtained prior to such enrichment shall be obtained prior
to the submission of the executive branch judgment regarding the export
in question and shall be set forth in such submission: And provided
further, That no source or special nuclear material shall be exported for
the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of
nations which has, after the date of enactment of this Act, entered into a
new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States,
except pursuant to such agreement.
(b) In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical
component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or
heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement
for cooperation (exempt an agreement for cooperation pursuant to
subsection 91c., 144b., 144c. of the 1954 Act) unless such agreement for
cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be
exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes of this
subsection, the term "major critical component" means any component
part or group of component parts which the President determines to be
essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel
reprocessing, or heavy water production facility.
Sec. 403. Peaceful Nuclear Activities - The President shall take immediate and vigorous steps to seek
agreement from all nations and groups of nations to commit themselves
to adhere to the following export policies with respect to their peaceful
nuclear activities and their participation in international nuclear trade:
(a) No nuclear materials and equipment and no sensitive nuclear
technology within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under
its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere will be transferred to the
jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the nation or
group of nations receiving such transfer commits itself to strict
undertakings including, but not limited to, provisions sufficient to ensure
that -
(1) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology
in, under the jurisdiction of, or under the control of any non-nuclearweapon
state, shall be used for nuclear explosive devices for any
purpose or for research on or development of nuclear explosive
devices for any purpose, except as permitted by Article V, the Treaty;
(2) IAEA safeguards will be applied to all peaceful nuclear
activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or under control of any nonnuclear-
weapon state;
(3) adequate physical security measures will be established and
maintained by any nation or group of nations on all of its nuclearactivities;
(4) no nuclear materials and equipment and no nuclear technology
intended for peaceful purposes in, under the jurisdiction of, or under
the control of any nation or group of nations shall be transferred to
the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations which does not
agree to stringent undertakings meeting the objectives of this section;
and
(5) no nation or group of nations will assist, encourage, or induce
any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire
any nuclear explosive device.
(b)(1) No source or special nuclear material within the territory of any
nation or group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control
anywhere will be enriched (as described in paragraph AA.(2) of section
11 of the 1954 Act) or reprocessed, no irradiated fuel elements
containing such material which are to be removed from a reactor will be
altered in form or content, and no fabrication or stockpiling involving
plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent
in the isotope 235 shall be performed except in a facility under effective
international auspices and inspection, and any such irradiated fuel
elements shall be transferred to such a facility as soon as practicable after
removal from a reactor consistent with safety requirements. Such
facilities shall be limited in number to the greatest extent feasible and
shall be carefully sited and managed so as to minimize the proliferation
and environmental risks associated with such facilities. In addition, there
shall be conditions to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon states other
than the host country to sensitive nuclear technology associated with
such facilities.
(2) Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of
nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the
necessary short-term storage of fuel elements containing plutonium,
uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the
isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel
elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (1) shall be
placed under effective international auspices and inspection.
(c) Adequate physical security measures will be established and
maintained with respect to all nuclear activities within the territory of
each nation and group of nations, under its jurisdiction, or under its
control anywhere, and with respect to any international shipment of
significant quantities of source or special nuclear material or irradiated
source or special nuclear material, which shall also be conducted under
international safeguards.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require international
control or supervision of any United States military activities.
Sec. 404. Renegotiation of Agreements for Cooperation - (a) The President shall initiate a program immediately to renegotiate agreements for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act,
or otherwise to obtain the agreement of parties to such agreements for
cooperation to the undertakings that would be required for new agreement under the 1954 Act. To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of enactment of this Act with a
cooperating party contains provisions equivalent to any or all of the
criteria set forth in section 127 of the 1954 Act with respect to materials
and equipment transferred pursuant thereto or with respect to any special
nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any such material
or equipment, any renegotiated agreement with that cooperating party
shall continue to contain an equivalent provision with respect to such
transferred materials and equipment and such special nuclear material.
To the extent that an agreement for cooperation in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act with a cooperating party does not contain
provisions with respect to any nuclear materials and equipment which
have previously been transferred under an agreement for cooperation
with the United States and which are under the jurisdiction or control of
the cooperating party and with respect to any special nuclear material
which is used in or produced through the use thereof and which is under
the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, which are equivalent
to any or all of those required for new and amended agreements for
cooperation under section 123a. of the 1954 Act, the President shall
vigorously seek to obtain the application of such provisions with respect
to such nuclear materials and equipment and such special nuclear
material. Nothing in this Act or in the 1954 Act shall be deemed to
relinquish any rights which the United States may have under any
agreement for cooperation in force on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) The President shall annually review each of requirements (1)
through (9) set forth for inclusion in agreements for cooperation under
section 123a. of the 1954 Act and the export policy goals set forth in
section 401 to determine whether it is in the interest of United States
non-proliferation objectives for any such requirements or export policies
which are not already being applied as export criteria to be enacted as
additional export criteria.
(c) If Presidential export criteria proposals, submittal to Congress.
the President proposes enactment of any such requirements or export
policies as additional export criteria or to take any other action with
respect to such requirements or export policy goals for the purpose of
encouraging adherence by nations and groups of nations to such
requirements and policies, he shall submit such a proposal together with
an explanation thereof to the Congress.
(d) If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the
Committee on Foreign Affairs6 of the House of Representatives, after
reviewing the President's annual report or any proposed legislation,
determines that it is in the interest of United States non-proliferation
objectives to take any action with respect to such requirements or export
policy goals, it shall report a joint resolution to implement such
determination. Any joint resolution so reported shall be considered in the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, under applicable
procedures provided for the consideration of resolutions pursuant to
subsection 130b. through g. of the 1954 Act.
Sec. 405. Authority to Continue Agreements - (a) The amendments to section 123 of the 1954 Act made by this Act shall not affect the authority to continue cooperation pursuant to
agreements for cooperation entered into prior to the date of enactment of
this Act.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority to include dispute
settlement provisions, including arbitration, in any agreement made
pursuant to an Agreement of Cooperation.
Sec. 406. Review - No court or regulatory body shall have any jurisdiction under any law
to compel the performance of or to review the adequacy of the
performance of any Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, or any
annexes thereto, called for in this Act or in the 1954 Act.
Sec. 407. Protection of the Environment - The president shall endeavor to provide in any agreement entered into pursuant to section 123 of the 1954 Act for cooperation between the
parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive,
chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear
activities.
Title V - United States Assistance to Developing Countries
Sec. 501. Policy: Report - The United States shall endeavor to cooperate with other nations,
international institutions, and private organizations in establishing
programs to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources, to
cooperate with both developing and industrialized nations in protecting
the international environment from contamination arising from both
nuclear and non-nuclear energy activities, and shall seek to cooperate
with and aid developing countries in meeting their energy needs through
the development of such resources and the application of non-nuclear
technologies consistent with the economic factors, the material resources
of those countries, and environmental protection. The United States shall
additionally seek to encourage other industrialized nations and groups of
nations to make commitments for similar cooperation and aid to
developing countries. The President shall report annually to Congress on
the level of other nations' and groups of nations' commitments under
such program and the relation of any such commitments to United States
efforts under this Title. In cooperating with and providing such assistance
to developing countries, the United States shall give priority to parties to
the Treaty.
Sec. 502. Programs - (a) The United States shall initiate a program, consistent with the
aims of section 501, to cooperate with developing countries for the
purpose of - (1) meeting the energy needs required for the development of
such countries; (2) reducing the dependence of such countries on petroleum fuels,
with emphasis given to utilizing solar and other renewable energy
resources; and (3) expanding the energy alternatives available to such countries.
(b) Such program shall include cooperation in evaluating the energy
alternatives of developing countries, facilitating international trade in
energy commodities, developing energy resources, and applying suitable
energy technologies. The program shall include both general and
country-specific energy assessments and cooperative projects in resource
exploration and production, training, research and development.
(c) As an integral part of such program, the Department of Energy,
under the general policy guidance of the Department of State and in
cooperation with the Agency for International Development and other
Federal agencies as appropriate, shall initiate, as soon as practicable, a
program for the exchange of United States scientists, technicians, and
energy experts with those of developing countries to implement the
purposes of this section.
(d) For the purposes of carrying out this section, there is authorized to
be appropriated such sums as are contained in annual authorization Acts
for the Department of Energy, including such sums which have been
authorized for such purposes under previous legislation.
(e) Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall
ensure the coordination of the activities authorized by this Title with
other related activities of the United States conducted abroad, including
the programs authorized by sections 103(c), 106(a)(2), and 119 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Sec. 503. Report - Not later than twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act,
the President shall report to the Congress on the feasibility of expanding
the cooperative activities established pursuant to section 502(c) into an
international cooperative effort to include a scientific peace corps
designed to encourage large numbers of technically trained volunteers to
live and work in developing countries for varying periods of time for the
purpose of engaging in projects to aid in meeting the energy needs of
such countries through the search for and utilization of indigenous energy
resources and the application of suitable technology, including the
widespread utilization of renewable and unconventional energy
technologies. Such report shall also include a discussion of other
mechanisms to conduct a coordinated international effort to develop,
demonstrate, and encourage the utilization of such technologies in
developing countries.
Title VI - Executive Reporting
Sec. 601. Reports of the President - (a) The President shall review all activities of Government
departments and agencies relating to preventing proliferation and shall
make a report to Congress in January of 1979 and annually in January of
each year thereafter on the Government's efforts to prevent proliferation.
This report shall include but not be limited to -
(1) a description of the progress made toward -
(A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in sections 104
and 105 of this Act;
(B) negotiating the international arrangements or other mutual
undertakings contemplated in section 403 of this Act;
(C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapons states that are not party
to the Treaty to adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence,
to enter into comparable agreements with respect to safeguards
and to forswear the development of any nuclear explosive
devices, and discouraging nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon
states which have not taken such steps;
(D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as contemplated
in section 201 of this Act; and
(E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as contemplated
in section 404(a) of this Act;
(2) an assessment of the impact of the progress, described in
paragraph (1) on the non-proliferation policy of the United States; an
explanation of the precise reasons why progress has not been made on
any particular point and recommendations with respect to appropriate
measures to encourage progress; and a statement of what legislative
modifications, if any, are necessary in his judgment to achieve the
non-proliferation policy of the United States;
(3) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states with
which the United States has an agreement for cooperation in effect or
under negotiation, if any, have -
(A) detonated a nuclear device; or
(B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on all of
their peaceful nuclear activities; or
(C) refused to give specific assurances that they will not
manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device; or
(D) engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear
material and having direct significance for the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear explosive devices;
(4) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth in this
Act have, on balance, been counterproductive from the standpoint of
preventing proliferation;
(5) a description of the progress made toward establishing
procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for
subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance the
reliability of the Unites States in meeting its commitments to supply
nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to effective nonproliferation
policies;
(6)8 a description of the implementation of nuclear and nuclearrelated
dual-use export controls in the preceding calendar year,
including a summary by type of commodity and destination of -
(A) all transactions for which -
(i) an export license was issued for any good controlled
under section 309(c) of this Act;
(ii) an export license was issued under section 109b. of the
1954 Act;
(iii) approvals were issued under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, or section 109b.(3) of the 1954
Act, for the retransfer of any item, technical data, component,
or substance; or
(iv) authorizations were made as required by section
57b.(2) of the 1954 Act to engage, directly or indirectly, in the
production of special nuclear material;
(B) each instance in which -
(i) a sanction has been imposed under section 821(a) or
section 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994 or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act;
(ii) sales or leases have been denied under section 3(f) of
the Arms Export Control Act or transactions prohibited by
reason of acts relating to proliferation of nuclear explosive
devices as described in section 40(d) of that Act;
(iii) a sanction has not been imposed by reason of section
821(c)(2) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994
or the imposition of a sanction has been delayed under section
102(b)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act; or
(iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made under -
(I) section 821(f) or section 824 of the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994,
(II) section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of section 102(b) of the
Arms Export Control Act,
(III) section 40(g) of the Arms Export Control Act with
respect to the last sentence of section 40(d) of that Act, or
(IV) section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
with respect to section 620E of that Act or section 3(f), the
last sentence of section 40(d), or 102(b)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act; and
(C) the progress of those independent states of the former
Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states and of the Baltic
states towards achieving the objective of applying full scope
safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. Portions of the
information required by paragraph (6) may be submitted in
classified form, as necessary. Any such information that may not
be published or disclosed under section 12(c)(1) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 shall be submitted as confidential.
(b) In the first report required by this section, the President shall
analyze each civil agreement for cooperation negotiated pursuant to
section 123 of the 1954 Act, and shall discuss the scope and adequacy of
the requirements and obligations relating to safeguards and other control
therein.
Sec. 602. Additional Reports - (a) Reports by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of
Energy. The annual reports to the Congress by the Commission and the
Department of Energy which are otherwise required by law shall also
include views and recommendations regarding the policies and actions of
the United States to prevent proliferation which are the statutory
responsibility of those agencies. The Department's report shall include a
detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment
and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative nuclear
fuel cycles. This part of the report shall include a comprehensive version
which includes any relevant classified information and a summary
unclassified version.
(b) Additional reporting requirements. The reporting requirements of this
title are in addition to and not in lieu of any other reporting requirements
under applicable law.
(c) Congressional notification of nonproliferation activities.
(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission,
and, with regard to subparagraph (B), the Director of Central
Intelligence, shall keep the Committees on Foreign Relations and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed
with respect to -
(A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of this Act
and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery; and
(B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significance
from the proliferation standpoint.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to paragraph (1)(B),
the phrase "fully and currently informed" means the transmittal of
credible information not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the
activity concerned.
(d) Classified portions of reports. Any classified portions of the reports
required by this Act shall be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
(e) [Omitted]
(f) Access by Secretary of Defense to information regarding nuclear
proliferation matters; applicability.
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall have access, on a timely basis, to all
information regarding nuclear proliferation matters which the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of Energy has or is entitled to have. Such access
shall include access to all communications, materials, documents, and
records relating to nuclear proliferation matters.
(2) This subsection does not apply to any intradepartmental document
of the Department of State or the Department of Energy, or any portion
of such document, that is solely concerned with internal, confidential
advice on policy concerning the conduct of interagency deliberations on
nuclear proliferation matters.
Sec. 603. Savings Clause - (a) All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, contracts,
agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges - (1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become
effective in the exercise of functions which are the subject of this Act,
by (i) any agency or officer, or part thereof, in exercising the
functions which are affected by this Act, or (ii) any court of
competent jurisdiction, and
(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated,
superseded, set aside, or repealed as the case may be, by the parties
thereto or by any court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the procedures or requirements
applicable to agreements for cooperation entered into pursuant to section
91c., 144b., or 144c. of the 1954 Act or arrangements pursuant thereto as
it was in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Except where otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall
take effect immediately upon enactment regardless of any requirement
for the promulgation of regulations to implement such provisions.
Other Provisions: Provision of Certain Information to Congress - (a) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION. - The head of each department and agency described in section 602(c) of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 USC 3282(c)) shall promptly provide
information to the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives in meeting the
requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of section 602 of such Act.
Photo above: Crater formed by the Sedan Nuclear Test, 1962, United States Federal Government. Courtesy Wikipedia Commons. Photo below: Secretary of State Averell Harriman (right) shaking hands during signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, one of first efforts at halting the spread of nuclear material, Marion S. Trikosko, August 8, 1963. Courtesy Library of Commerce. Source Info: Electronic Research Collections, United States Department of State, University of Illinois Richard J. Daley Library; United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission; govtrack.us; the Nuclear Information Project; Wikipedia Commons.
